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INTRODUCTION
Much of the legal scholarship on state compliance with international
obligations analyzes states as unitary actors, without also considering the
impact of behavior at the small group and individual levels.' The unitary
t © 2006 by Charles K. Whitehead. All rights reserved.
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1. State "compliance" refers to conformity between state action and a rule or standard.
See Kal Raustiala, Compliance & Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation, 32
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 387, 388 (2000). It differs from (but includes) state implementation
of norms through domestic legislation or other domestic processes, focusing on whether states
in fact adhere to the implementing measures they have instituted. See Dinah Shelton, Introduc-
tion: Law, Non-Law and the Problem of "Soft Law," in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE 1, 5
(2000) [hereinafter COMMITMENT]. State compliance is particularly important in the case of
instruments that regulate the behavior of non-state actors. To be effective, a state must imple-
ment appropriate legislation and enforce a "full-blown domestic regime" designed to comply
with its requirements. See Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47
INT'L ORG. 175, 193-94 (1993) [hereinafter Chayes & Chayes, On Compliance]. Except
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state is a useful construct for descriptive and analytic purposes. Yet it
fails to fully describe interactions among states, which often take place
within a less well-defined constellation of power structures, elites, bu-
reaucrats, and other actors who influence state action and compliance.2
The unitary model, consequently, understates the impact on compliance
of informal pressures at the small group and individual levels,3 and of
potentially competing interests between domestic and international state• 4
representatives.
When individuals are taken into account, analyses of state compli-
ance tend to be descriptive. They document the growth of cross-border
coordination among regulators, through formal and informal organiza-
tions, conferences, agreements, and relationships, and the resulting
development of government or regulatory "networks" that assist states to
comply with international obligations.5 Those analyses, however, provide
an incomplete explanation of how network members interact, to what
extent network structures influence regulatory behavior, and, in turn,
where the context otherwise requires, references to "states" (or to a particular state) include
nations as well as government institutions, regulatory bodies, agencies, and officials acting on
behalf of those nations. See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 12-13 (2004)
(explaining how a description of the international legal system premised only on unitary states
is incomplete).
2. See Alastair lain Johnston, The Social Effects of International Institutions on Do-
mestic (Foreign Policy) Actors, in LOCATING THE PROPER AUTHORITIES 145, 148-49 (2003)
(analyzing the influence of international institutions on domestic, foreign policy-related agen-
cies and actors).
3. See infra notes 59-71, 86-95 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 73-76, 149-155 and accompanying text.
5. A network is "a pattern of regular and purposive relations among like government
units working across the borders that divide countries from one another and that demarcate the
'domestic' from the 'international' sphere." SLAUGHTER, supra note 1, at 14. In this Article,
references to a "bank regulatory network" (or similar reference) are to: Annual General Meet-
ing participants of the Bank for International Settlements [hereinafter BIS], see BIS, The BIS in
Profile (2006), http://www.bis.org/about/profile.pdf (listing member states); members of the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision [hereinafter Basel Comm. or Committee], see BIS,
Fact Sheet-Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, http://www.bis.org/about/factbcbs.htm
(last visited Mar. 19, 2006) (listing member organizations); and their staffs, see infra notes 43-45
and accompanying text, comprised of key international bank regulators and supervisors, many
of whom hold express, delegated, or other discretionary authority to give effect to interna-
tional banking standards, see JOSEPH JUDE NORTON, DEVISING INTERNATIONAL BANK
SUPERVISORY STANDARDS 257 (1995). In certain cases, the network may extend to senior
regulators who participate in regional supervisory groupings. See Peter C. Hayward, Prospects
for International Cooperation by Bank Supervisors, 24 INT'L L. 787, 792-93 (1990); Sol
Picciotto, Networks in International Economic Integration: Fragmented States and the Di-
lemmas of Neo-Liberalism, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUs. 1014, 1041 (1997). In the case of
Japan, bank regulatory network members typically have included officials from the Interna-
tional Finance and Banking Bureaus of the Ministry of Finance, which was principally
responsible for supervising Japan's financial services industry (succeeded by the Financial
Services Agency), and the Bank of Japan.
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how those factors influence state action.6 The result is a recognition of
the role of small groups and individuals in state-to-state coordination
without the benefit of a framework to fully describe how state compli-
ance is affected by the network (and other) forces that influence senior
regulators!
Norms-based analyses of state compliance, as well, have tended to
consider the broad international norms within which states and state rela-
tionships exist without fully analyzing the relationships between norms
and networks at the individual or small group levels. Some scholars con-
tend that a normative presumption of compliance, in the absence of
strong countervailing circumstances, guides state action.8 Others analyze
the process by which states create and internalize international norms. 9
Still others accept the constructivist role of norms in the international
decision-making process, partly as a means to explain why certain states
value compliance more than others.' °
This Article proposes a new approach to understanding state
compliance with international obligations, positing that increased
interaction among the world's regulators has reinforced network norms,"
6. See infra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. There has, of course, been substan-
tial work on the relationship between networks and compliance. See, e.g., SLAUGHTER, supra
note 1; Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental
Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT'L LAW 1 (2002).
7. See Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing
Conceptions of International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 345, 368 (1998) (Interactions among
regulators and between regulators and others "are not well captured in standard international
legal typologies (e.g., the sharp sources-based distinction often drawn between binding and
non-binding norms)."); Robert E. Scott & Paul B. Stephan, Self-Enforcing International
Agreements and the Limits of Coercion, 2004 WIs. L. REV. 551, 628 (2004) ("[W]e need a
theory that can better explain the relationship between individual preferences and the behavior
of states.").
8. See, e.g., ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 8 (1995) [hereinafter,
CHAYES & CHAYES, SOVEREIGNTY]; Louis HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND
VALUES 48-51 (1995).
9. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181
(1996); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599
(1997) [hereinafter Koh, Why Do Nations Obey]; Harold Hongju Koh, How is International
Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 Ind. L.J. 1397 (1999) [hereinafter Koh, International Hu-
man Rights]; Harold Hongju Koh, Opening Remarks: Transnational Legal Process
Illuminated, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES 327 (2002).
10. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH V. KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS, AND DECISIONS 10-16, 61-
67 (1989). See also Koh, Why Do Nations Obey, supra note 9, at 2633-34 (describing con-
structivist and "international society" perceptions of the role of norms in international
compliance). The importance of norms in international relations is also described in the inter-
national regimes scholarship. See, e.g., Robert Axelrod & Robert 0. Keohane, Achieving
Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions, in COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY
226, 248-52 (1986).
11. In this Article, "network norms" refers to norms formed among regulatory network
members. The term "norms" has been variously defined, but it is understood generally to refer
Spring 20061
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as evidenced in part by a greater reliance among states on legally
nonbinding instruments. This Article also begins to fill a gap in the
growing scholarship on state compliance by proposing a better
framework for understanding how international norms influence senior
regulators and how they affect both state decisions to comply as well as
levels of compliance.12
This new approach suggests that, under certain circumstances, net-
work forces affecting state action may permit levels of compliance that
differ from those expected by market and other actors outside the net-
work. Market forces, consequently, may impose costs for a failure to
comply, even in the absence of network sanction. Network norms may
also raise agency questions for regulators who are both national repre-
sentatives and network members, requiring them to balance their
interests in enhancing network status and effectiveness against compet-
ing interests at home. Regulation's prospective role in balancing that
conflict highlights the importance of emerging scholarship on global
administrative law and procedure.
to informal, nonlegal rules that affect individual actions. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Regu-
lation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 943, 958 (1995) [hereinafter Lessig, Social
Meaning] ("the collection of understandings or expectations shared by some group at a par-
ticular time and place" that are "taken for granted by those within the group") (emphasis
omitted); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 914
(1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Social Norms] ("social attitudes of approval and disapproval,
specifying what ought to be done and what ought not to be done"); Robert D. Cooter, Decen-
tralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law
Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1656-57 (1996) (norms as obligations); Eric A. Posner,
Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1699-1701 (1996) [herein-
after Posner, Inefficient Norms] (rules distinguishing desirable and undesirable behavior,
giving authority to a third party to punish behaviors that are undesirable); Richard H.
McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 340
(1997) ("informal social regularities that individuals feel obligated to follow because of an
internalized sense of duty, because of a fear of external non-legal sanctions, or both"); Melvin
A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COL. L. REV. 1253, 1255 (1999) ("all
rules and regularities concerning human conduct, other than legal rules and organizational
rules").
12. See Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90
CALIF. L. REV. 1823, 1832 (2002) ("[W]e have no theory of why norms operate as a force for
compliance. Without a theoretical framework, the norms argument is not helpful in under-
standing state behavior."); Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International
Lawmaking: The Tale of Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 125, 131
(2005) ("[I]n their wariness of the state, [norms] scholars neglect government technocrats as a
source of transnational social norms and likewise fail to explore the relationship between
informal norms and formal law.").
[Vol. 27:695
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For illustration, I rely principally on the Basel Accord of 1988,"3
which set an international standard for minimum risk-weighted bank
capital; Japan's experience in complying with the Accord; and recent
studies indicating that state compliance with the Accord may vary sig-
nificantly from state to state.' 4 Any analysis of Accord compliance must
include Japan in light of that state's global prominence in the banking
industry."
Before proceeding, I wish to note two caveats. First, I am sensitive
to my reliance on Japan's experience in complying with the Accord to
illustrate the influence of network norms on compliance. Cross-border
interaction among state representatives is likely to differ from field to
field in both frequency and kind 6 and compliance may be impacted by
whether or not an instrument, like the Accord, is legally binding. 7 Conse-
quently, while this Article's approach may extend to networks generally,
differences in how members interact and across instruments may affect the
influence of network norms on state action. In addition, empirical data on
network effectiveness and compliance with international obligations is
13. Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of Capital
Measurement and Capital Standards (July 1988), http://www.bis.org/publbcbs04a.pdf [here-
inafter Accord or Basel Accord]. Authors refer variously to the "Basle" or "Basel" Accord.
This Article uses "Basel," except in quoting or citing others who have adopted a different
spelling. The Basel Committee announced revisions to the Accord in November 2005, follow-
ing five years of proposals, consultations, and studies, to be implemented in late 2006 and
2007. The revised accord (commonly known as "Basel II") is principally organized along
three pillars: Minimum Capital Requirements; Supervisory Review Process; and Market Dis-
cipline. The first pillar establishes capital requirements that are more risk-sensitive than in the
original Accord, relying to a much greater degree on each bank's own risk assessments. The
second pillar provides guidelines for supervisory review of bank efforts in assessing capital
adequacy. Public disclosures provided under the third pillar are intended to reinforce the first
two by providing market actors with sufficient information to gauge a bank's capital adequacy.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of Capital Measure-
ment and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework (Nov. 2005), http://www.bis.org/publ/
bcbsl 18.pdf.
14. See infra notes 240-244 and accompanying text. Those variations have competitive
implications, potentially providing banks in states with lower capital requirements with pric-
ing and regulatory advantages. See infra notes 168, 204 and accompanying text.
15. Between 1990 and 2001, Japan comprised roughly one-third of total banking assets
in the world's most economically-developed states. Jaap Bikker & Paul Metzemakers, Is Bank
Capital Procyclical? A Cross-country Analysis 5-8 (De Nederlandsche Bank NV, Working
Paper No. 9, 2004) (analyzing 29 OECD states, using Accord-based calculations).
16. See David H. Moore, A Signaling Theory of Human Rights Compliance, 97 Nw. U.
L. REV. 879, 898 (2003).
17. Compare Guzman, supra note 12, at 1881 ("Agreements among states lie on a spec-
trum of commitment. The same reputational issues influence such promises regardless of the
form in which they are made, but the magnitude of the reputational effect varies with the level
of commitment."), with Scott & Stephan, supra note 7, at 591 (Guzman "collapses the ques-
tion of the reputational effects and formal international-law doctrine in a way that assumes
that international-law experts are the only relevant audience.").
Spring 2006]
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limited,'8 and so reliance on a particular case study may offer the most
useful guidance at this stage.' 9 Analyzing the Accord is also relevant,
since it is often held out as an example of the effectiveness of nonlegal
instruments in global reg 20instumet   balregulation.
Second, analyzing the potential effects of network norms on regula-
tors raises some special difficulties. The impact of network norms on a
regulator may vary depending on her seniority, and so the level at which
one considers those effects may also influence the analysis. National
differences in institutional and social structure, as well, influence how
norms affect behavior and regulatory action. Consequently, this Article
should be considered a first step towards better understanding the rela-
tionship between network-based forces and state compliance. A norms
analysis provides a useful, but preliminary, framework to consider the
effect of those forces on levels of state compliance.
This Article proceeds in three stages. Part I analyzes the potentially
coercive effect of network norms on network members. Groups may de-
velop norms with which all members are expected to comply and
corresponding sanctions for a failure to do so. Compliance with those
norms may be costly, reflecting competing political or other interests at
home. Network cooperation, however, is important to financial regula-
tors, who must coordinate with others in order to remain relevant to the
institutions they oversee, and so defection may be costlier. Members,
therefore, have strong incentives to signal their cooperation, particularly
if a failure to do so weakens their standing and influence within an im-
portant network.
18. Regarding networks, see Kenneth Anderson, Squaring the Circle? Reconciling
Sovereignty and Global Governance through Global Government Networks, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 1255, 1278 (2005) (Network effectiveness "is, as an empirical matter, in many instances
probably fiendishly difficult to answer."). Regarding international compliance, see Oona A.
Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1937 (2002)
("[T]he claim that international law matters was until recently so widely accepted among
international lawyers that there have been relatively few efforts to examine its accuracy.");
Kingsbury, supra note 7, at 346 ("[I]n many areas we simply do not have systematic studies to
show whether or not most states conform to most international law rules most of the time."
(citations omitted)).
19. Generalizations based on case studies may also involve pitfalls, see Gregory
Mitchell, Case Studies, Counterfactuals, and Causal Explanations, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1517,
1545-61 (2004), and so the framework proposed in this Article is offered as only one explana-
tion of the impact of network norms on regulators and compliance.
20. Network relationships in financial fields outside of banking have characteristics that
are similar to those described in this Article. See David Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard and
Soft, in International Law, 5 CI. J. INT'L L. 547, 569-72 (2005) [hereinafter Zaring, Infor-
mal Procedure] (describing similarities in global regulatory relationships in the banking,
securities, and insurance industries). Those similarities suggest this Article's analysis may
apply, as well, to network forces outside of the banking field, such as in international securi-
ties and insurance regulation.
[Vol. 27:695
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Network norms also help define which state actions constitute sig-
nals and the meanings of those signals. A state action that is observable
by others (such as implementing the 8% capital minimum in the Basel
Accord21) may be considered the concrete expression of an abstract net-
work norm (such as a norm of cooperation).22 State representatives who
implement the 8% minimum may be seen as signaling their support of
the broader norm; those who fail to do so may be understood to have
defected from the network.
Actual compliance, however, may be weaker. A state may fail to
fully comply with an international standard yet not be considered in de-
fection, perhaps reflecting an understanding among network members
that partial compliance is still "close enough." States, therefore, may
signal compliance when they implement the relevant standard, even
when actual compliance is lower. If this description is accurate, then tra-
ditional concepts of "compliance" may not apply internationally; rather,
what constitutes compliance may vary among networks and over time,
based on differences in network norms.
Part II provides a summary of Japan's experience with the Accord to
illustrate the new approach described in this Article. Japan's compliance
has been checkered-initially believed by Japan's regulators and banks
to be manageable but increasingly difficult as Japan's banking industry
weakened. Japan's authorities, nevertheless, have maintained the Ac-
cord's 8% minimum, even while amending accounting, tax, and other
rules and forbearing from fully enforcing Japan's capital regulations in
order to help Japanese banks meet that minimum.
Within the new framework proposed by this Article, implementing the
8% standard was important to Japan, signaling to global regulators Ja-
pan's willingness to cooperate, even when actual compliance with the
21. The 8% capital minimum is applicable to internationally active banks. For a de-
scription of the Accord and the 8% minimum, see infra note 146.
22. For an account of the Accord's creation, see ETHAN B. KAPSTEIN, GOVERNING THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY 103-28 (1994) [hereinafter KAPSTEIN, GLOBAL ECONOMY]; infra at notes
169-172, 180 and accompanying text. Why 8% (as opposed to another network standard) was
adopted is beyond the scope of this Article, although norms scholarship may provide a frame-
work for future research. For example, a group's leaders may be instrumental in developing or
changing norms. See, e.g., Lessig, Social Meaning, supra note 11, at 982-86 (Soviet "cultural
management"); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2021, 2030-31 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Expressive Function] (norm entrepreneurs). Al-
ternatively, individuals may develop norms that catalyze the formation of groups. See, e.g.,
McAdams, supra note 11, at 358-61 (consensus about esteem-worthiness of certain behavior
may give rise to group norms); Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 11, at 920 (people dissatis-
fied with prevailing norms can leave one group for another). Members of existing close-knit
groups may also develop norms through informal and repeated interaction. See, e.g., ROBERT
C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 167 (1991) (cattle
ranchers); Robert Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 947, 950-
51 (1997) (examples of small groups that have developed informal rules for cooperation).
Spring 2006]
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Accord was lower. Japan's implementation and enforcement reflected
competing domestic interests, on balance favoring formal implementa-
tion of the Accord but forbearance from fully enforcing its terms.
Network norms, however, may have modified members' understanding
of what levels of compliance were acceptable, particularly in light of the
extraordinary decline in Japan's economy. Even in the face of weak
compliance, Japan may not have been perceived by network members to
have defected from the Accord.
A recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) study suggests that Ja-
pan's experience may not be isolated. While over 100 states have
implemented the 8% minimum, the IMF study suggests that a significant
number of them may forebear from fully enforcing the Accord's terms."
The conclusion notes that the practical effect of global standards
may vary substantially at the national level so long as administration dif-
fers from state to state. Those differences may partly reflect network
norms and other forces that permit variations in state compliance.
I. A NORMS-BASED APPROACH TO STATE COMPLIANCE
A number of theories have been advanced to explain levels of state
compliance with international obligations. 24 Much of the international
law scholarship considers states as unitary actors without analyzing the
relationship between individual behavior and state compliance.25 States,
of course, continue to be the most important actors in the international
system. Nevertheless, individuals, not states, maintain the global rela-
tionships from which standards like the Accord emerge.26 Consideration
23. See infra notes 240-242 and accompanying text.
24. For a review of international legal and international relations theories of state com-
pliance, see Guzman, supra note 12, at 1830-40; Hathaway, supra note 18, at 1942-62; Kal
Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law, International Relations and Compli-
ance, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 538, 539-45 (Walter Carlsnaes,
Thomas Risse & Beth A. Simmons eds., 2002). Regarding state compliance with legally non-
binding obligations, see Peter M. Haas, Choosing to Comply: Theorizing from International
Relations and Comparative Politics, in COMMITMENT, supra note 1, 43-64; Edith Brown
Weiss, Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH NONBINDING AccoRDs 1, 7-14
(1997). An annotated bibliography appears in William C. Bradford, International Legal Com-
pliance: An Annotated Bibliography, 30 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 379 (2004).
25. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
26. See Enrico Colombatto & Jonathan Macey, A Public Choice Model of International
Economic Cooperation and the Decline of the Nation State, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 925, 931
(1996) ("Institutions in general, and governments in particular, do not have preferences, peo-
ple do."); Scott & Stephan, supra note 7, at 593 (noting that domestic "[r]egimes comprise
individuals").
[Vol. 27:695
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of those relationships is important to an understanding of the forces that
affect state compliance .
Norms-based analyses also tend to consider states as unitary ac-
tors . One notable exception is Harold Koh's theory of transnational
legal process, which posits that state compliance may improve as states
internalize international norms,29 over time generating internal, self-
reinforcing patterns of compliance and, if effective, obedience through
30
a complex series of social, political, and legal processes.
In this Part, I propose a new approach to understanding state compli-
ance based upon an analysis of regulatory networks, norms, and
signaling. Consistent with Koh, this approach suggests that increased
interaction among global regulators has reinforced international norms,
affecting the outlook and actions of senior regulators and, in turn, influ-
encing levels of state compliance with international obligations.3' The
implementation of certain network standards may signal a regulator's
support for, and be supported by, abstract network norms of cooperation.
I then consider the potentially coercive effect of norms-their ability
to compel "'public conformity without private acceptance,'" with states
formally adopting global standards, even in the face of competing do-
mestic interests, without fully enforcing them. 2 Resulting levels of state
compliance may reflect a balance between these two forces, with lower
levels still sending the "right" signal if a network norm excuses defec-
tion. The relational nature of instruments that evidence a norm may
permit states to vary levels of compliance yet still be understood among
network members to signal support for that norm. I suggest some princi-
pal implications of this new approach at the end.
A. Regulatory Networks
The growth of cross-border regulatory networks has helped extend the
reach of domestic regulators, permitting bureaucracies to close gaps across
27. See infra notes 59-71, 73-76, 86-95, 149-155 and accompanying text; see also
Johnston, supra note 2, at 149 ("[C]ausal processes by which systemic normative structures
... affect behavior [in international relations] are mostly assumed rather than shown." (foot-
note omitted)).
28. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
29. Koh, International Human Rights, supra note 9, at 1400-01.
30. Id. at 1406-14.
31. See id. at 1399, 1409-10.
32. Franklin J. Boster, Commentary on Compliance-Gaining Message Behavior Re-
search, in COMMUNICATION AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE PROCESSES 91, 96 (1995) (citation
omitted). Even where states have internalized norms, it is common for there also to be external
sanctions for a failure to comply. See Gary Goertz & Paul F. Diehl, Toward a Theory of Inter-
national Norms, 36 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 634, 638 (1992).
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jurisdictions and facilitating a convergence in standards and regulation.33
At the same time, network cooperation has become increasingly impor-
tant to financial regulators as one means of keeping pace with the
growing globalization of the financial industry.4 Cross-border networks,
consequently, play an increasingly important role in the daily lives of
senior regulators.
By facilitating increased levels of interaction, networks assist in
forming long-term relationships among like-minded regulators in differ-
ent states-in some instances, with interests far more in common with
36their international counterparts than with peers in their home state.
Over time, as one observer has noted, networks foster "the creation of
common ties, personal relationships, camaraderie, a shared professional
and social outlook, and an expectation that what others in the network
think of what I do in my home jurisdiction ... genuinely matters."37 In
doing so, network members may become professionally socialized and
incorporated into organized patterns of interaction,38 gradually taking on
group-based ways of thinking and acting39 and giving up the "privilege of
dissonance" while they remain a part of the network.4 Networks, in fact,
exhibit many of the same characteristics that norms scholarship predicts
among group members-the building of relationships, the exchange of
33. See Raustiala, supra note 6, at 24-25.
34. See infra notes 127-130 and accompanying text. See also Jonathan R. Macey,
Regulatory Globalization as a Response to Regulatory Competition, 52 EMORY L.J. 1353,
1354-55, 1357-58 (2003) (proposing that regulatory globalization is a "survival response" by
bureaucrats threatened by increased competition and private sector globalization); David An-
drew Singer, Capital Rules: The Domestic Politics of International Regulatory Harmonization,
58 INT'L ORG. 531, 543-44 (2004) (noting that international regulatory harmonization is more
likely to occur when exogenous shocks affect domestic market confidence or competitive-
ness).
35. Raustiala, supra note 6, at 4-5. See also Ethan Barnaby Kapstein, Between Power
and Purpose: Central Bankers and the Politics of Regulatory Convergence, 46 INT'L ORG.
265, 267-68 (1992) (describing common characteristics of central bankers).
36. Macey, supra note 34, at 1372.
37. Anderson, supra note 18, at 1272. Like Anderson, my own experience in interna-
tional banking is that socialization is a key function of cross-border regulatory networks. See
also Raustiala, supra note 6, at 55 n.253 (noting that government interviewees stressed the
importance of network socialization to regulatory export).
38. Sheldon Stryker & Anne Statham, Symbolic Interaction and Role Theory, in 1
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 311, 325 (1985).
39. Johnston, supra note 2, at 150. A well-known study of the controlling effects of
socialization is set out in NORBERT ELIAS, THE CIVILIZING PROCESS (Edmund Jephcott trans.,
Blackwell Publishers 1994) (1939). Elias used a number of examples, including the evolution
of table manners and polite speech, to illustrate how socialization in medieval societies pro-
vided central authorities with a means to control other classes. Id. at 269-72.
40. Anderson, supra note 18, at 1272.
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information, the development of network standards, and the professional
socialization of members.'
Global networks also function as conduits for information regarding
their members-their competence, quality, integrity, and professional-
ism-and rely on many of the same mechanisms, such as reputation,
information, and exclusion, that typically reinforce group cohesion and
norms.42 Adhering to network-based standards may encourage praise,
and deviation may cause embarrassment or shame43 that results in a loss
of prestige or influence among peer regulators as the violation becomes
known to others."
In the financial world, networks typically are comprised of informal
organizations, like the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, with
representatives selected from among top central bankers and regulatory
officials. 4 Around them are senior directors, officials, and other banking
figures who typically engage in informal and personalized contacts with
global peers through Committee membership and activities in other in-
ternational organizations. 6 Interaction among bank regulatory network
members may extend beyond the Basel Committee, for example, to G- 10
meetings where network membership overlaps, potentially making net-
work standing important to, and influenced by, relationships outside the
network.41
41. SLAUGHTER, supra note 1, at 3-4. See also Amitai Aviram, Regulation by Networks,
2003 BYU L. REV. 1179, 1225 (2003) (describing the creation of a "common culture" among
network members).
42. SLAUGHTER, supra note 1, at 136-37, 196-200. See also Aviram, supra note 41, at
1205-07 (noting that the use of reputation, information, and exclusion reinforces network
norms).
43. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 555
(2000) ("[I]nformal praise and shame were often found to be important" in epistemic commu-
nities formed around the globalization of business regulation.); Aviram, supra note 41, at 1225
("[In networks] a common culture creates a unique good-esteem or social standing in the
group--which can be a powerful motivator to follow the norms of the group.").
44. SLAUGHTER, supra note 1, at 54-55.
45. The Committee was formed under the auspices of the BIS in Basel, Switzerland, in
1974. Membership is comprised of representatives from Belgium, Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. See NORTON, supra note 5, at 171-244 (providing a detailed description
of the Committee and its history). See also David Zaring, International Law by Other Means:
The Twilight Existence of International Financial Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 281, 287-91 (1998) [hereinafter Zaring, Other Means]; Zaring, Informal Procedure, su-
pra note 20, at 555-61.
46. Picciotto, supra note 5, at 1042.
47. BIS and Basel Committee members actively participate in other meetings among
global financial leaders and regulators, such as the G-10 summits. See C. FRED BERGSTEN &
C. RANDALL HENNING, GLOBAL ECONoMIc LEADERSHIP AND THE GROUP OF SEVEN 13-15
(1996); PETER I. HAJNAL, THE G7/G8 SYSTEM: EVOLUTION, ROLE AND DOCUMENTATION 45-
46 (1999); John M. Berry, Banking's Key Players, WASH. POST, June 28, 1998, at HO (de-
scribing overlapping memberships in G-10, BIS, and the Basel Committee and cross-border
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B. Network Norms
Regulators are subject to a spectrum of pressures that affect their ac-
tions48 and influence the exercise of their "considerable discretion" in
coordinating with their foreign counterparts.4 9 The historical and social
context of international negotiations, for example, may influence how
regulators interact.0 As I describe below, network norms may also influ-
ence members' actions and, in turn, state compliance with international
obligations. I consider three characteristics of network norms in this sec-
tion.
First, network norms may be coercive. A member may have little
control over the creation or enforcement of a norm but may risk incur-
ring network sanction for failing to comply with that norm. A state may,
as a result, implement a network norm even in the face of competing
domestic interests. Actual compliance, however, may reflect a balance
between network benefits/sanctions and those interests.
senior and staff relationships). Like the BIS and Basel Committee, G-10 meetings reinforce
social relationships among senior regulators through summits and year-round meetings at the
ministerial and subministerial levels. See HAJNAL, supra, at 35-44 (describing G-7 meetings).
As one observer has commented, those meetings create consensus "through the ... delibera-
tive function of forcing the leaders to get acquainted, listen and learn about one another's
national constraints, priorities and goals, exchange confidences directly and privately, and
thereby create the trust that leads to effective ongoing relationships, especially at times of
shocks or crisis." John Kirton, The Summit as An Effective Global Concert, in THE DIPLo-
MACY OF CONCERT: CANADA, THE G7 AND THE HALIFAX SUMMIT (1995), http://
www.g8.utoronto.ca/scholar/kirtonl 99501/cfp95glo. htm.
48. Richard B. Bilder, Beyond Compliance: Helping Nations Cooperate, in COMMIT-
MENT, supra note 1, at 68 ("[O]fficials will usually assess how they expect foreign office
officials to behave on the basis of all the varied considerations and pressures which they see as
acting on those officials, not simply on the basis of alleged 'hard' or 'soft' norms alone.").
49. Singer, supra note 34, at 534-35 (noting, however, that regulatory discretion is
constrained by legislative preferences). See also infra note 74 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the two-level game metaphor.
50. Leonard Schoppa argues that norms goveming negotiations between U.S. and Japa-
nese representatives during the 1980s and early 1990s originated 40 years earlier when Japan
was dependent on the United States for its security and economic well-being. Leonard J.
Schoppa, The Social Context in Coercive International Bargaining, 53 INT'L ORG. 307, 309
(1999). Japanese of that generation, he contends, came to accept Japan's hierarchical relation-
ship with the United States, which survived in their minds even after that relationship
changed. Id. at 318-21. Schoppa then describes how generational transition may have influ-
enced the outcome of economic bargaining in the 1980s and 1990s. Id. at 325-32. Similar
influences may have affected negotiations over the Accord. U.S. officials met several times
with their Japanese counterparts, on occasion using "'heavy-handed tactics,'" STEVEN SOLO-
MON, THE CONFIDENCE GAME 432 (1995) (quoting a European central banker), before Japan
agreed to come on board. Echoing Schoppa's point, a former Vice Minister commented some
years later, "'There is not a single official in the [Ministry of Finance] who knows a world
where the U.S. doesn't bail out Japan.'" Robert Neff, Commentary: A Major Roadblock
for Reform: The U.S., Bus. WK. (Int'l Ed.), Nov. 30, 1998, available at http://
www.businessweek.com/1998/ 48/b3606017.htm.
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Second, network norms help define which state actions constitute
signals and the meanings of those signals. Depending on context, im-
plementing a network-based standard may be considered a concrete
expression of support for a more abstract norm of cooperation. That sig-
nal may be accepted by others, even if actual compliance is weak, due to
the associated costs of implementing and committing to that standard.
Third, network norms may modify levels of compliance that are ac-
ceptable to network members. States, for example, may fail to fully
comply with a global standard yet be understood by network members to
be "close enough" when that deviation is excused under a network norm.
1. The Coerciveness of Social Norms
By limiting discretion, social norms may coerce the actions of net-
work members.5 Typically, no single member controls the creation of a
norm or any associated reward or punishment for compliance or defec-
tion, although all members may be subject to the constraints on behavior
which that norm imposes.52 The result, as Cass Sunstein has noted, "can
be a serious obstacle to freedom in the fact that individual choices are a
function of social norms, social meanings, and social roles, which indi-
vidual agents may deplore, and over which individual agents have little
or no control. 53 Reflecting that tension, international government nego-
tiators are often split when setting global standards between a desire to
maintain their own flexibility and an interest in increasing the predict-
ability of their counterparts' behavior."
Norms regulate behavior by taxing and subsidizing actions associ-
ated with defection and compliance.5 Adherence to a network norm may
51. The role of coercive power in interpersonal and group relations has long been rec-
ognized. See, e.g., John R.P. French, Jr., A Formal Theory of Social Power, 65 PSYCH. REV.
181, 183-84 (1956) (describing different bases of interpersonal power). "Coercion" refers to
an exercise of power by a person (or persons) over another (the "target") through the threat of
sanction if the target fails to act as requested. Michael D. Bayles, A Concept of Coercion, in
COERCION, NoMos xiv 16, 17 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1972). The target
may ignore the request, but it will be sanctioned for doing so. Id. at 18. Rewards and punish-
ments are "social" where only those groups valued by the affected actor can provide them.
Johnston, supra note 2, at 165.
52. As Lawrence Lessig notes, "Social norms regulate as well. They are a second sort
of constraint [after law]." Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661,
662 (1998). "Norm entrepreneurs," however, may influence changes in behavior by exploiting
private dissatisfaction with existing norms. Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 11, at 929.
Internationally, elites may also affect group norms, acting as "deft puppeteers, capable of
pulling strings and moving big players that remain passive until activated by someone who can
show them where their interests lie." BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 43, at 495.
53. Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 11, at 910.
54. Bilder, supra note 48, at 67.
55. Consequently, a larger group may reinforce members' incentives to adhere to a
norm if the magnitude of influences on individual action-the costs of defection and benefits
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enhance a member's status among her network peers. Violation, con-
versely, may cause network members to apply sanctions, most
effectively by dismissing (or threatening to dismiss) the violator from the
group.56 Dismissal, however, is a harsh punishment and rarely used
among international regulators.57 It also presents a classic end-game
problem-the dismissed member, feeling she has little to lose by chal-
lenging the norm, may behave in a manner that is costly to the remaining
members.5"
Norms scholarship, therefore, posits that norms may evolve through
more subtle means of reward and punishment involving group promi-
nence, social approval, shame, and guilt-in other words, group or peer
pressure. 9 Thus, the Basel Committee uses peer pressure to enforce con-
sensus when there are different or dissenting views.60 The resulting
of adherence-increases at a rate greater than the increase in related transaction costs. See
Johnston, supra note 2, at 187-88 ("From a social influence perspective . .. more may be
better."); Barak D. Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive
Theory of Private Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2328, 2340 n.36 (2004) (observing that
reputation mechanisms, including those resting on social norms, can remain effective as com-
munity size grows when they spread accurate and necessary information). See also Eisenberg,
supra note 11, at 1263-64 (examining the critical mass and tipping effects of norms);
Raustiala, supra note 4, at 62-70 (noting the network effects of regulatory convergence
through transgovernmental networks).
56. See Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Rela-
tions in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 129 (1992); Janet T. Landa, A Theory
of the Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group: An Institutional Alternative to Contract
Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 349, 356 (1981).
57. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 1, at 200-01 (members are reluctant to censure one
another).
58. See Bernstein, supra note 56, at 129 (suggesting that expelled members may turn to
legal remedies in contravention of a norm that directs reliance principally on extralegal meas-
ures). See also SLAUGHTER, supra note 1, at 200 (noting that network suspension may be
more effective than exclusion).
59. See, e.g., McAdams, supra note 11, at 355-75 (proposing an esteem-based theory
of the creation and maintenance of norms). The relative importance of those pressures in
forming norms may vary among states. Sociologists note, for example, the relative pervasive-
ness of shame in Japanese culture, in contrast to the prominence of guilt in the United States.
See, e.g., Millie R. Creighton, Revisiting Shame and Guilt Cultures: A Forty-Year Pilgrimage,
18 ETHOS 279, 301-03 (1988). Some experts assert that the role of norms in creating shame or
guilt in Japan differs from its corresponding role in Western cultures. See, e.g., Takie Sugi-
yama Lebra, Shame and Guilt: A Psychocultural View of the Japanese Self, 11 ETHOS 192,
192-94 (1983). Accordingly, an esteem-based sanction may have a different impact in Japan
than in a Western state. Likewise, the effectiveness of laws transferred from one state to an-
other may depend on extralegal conditions, such as the relative impact of norms, in the
receiving state. See Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, Economic
Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect, 47 EUR. EcoN. REV. 165, 167 (2003) (exam-
ining the "transplant effect" of adopting one state's laws in another without adaptation to local
conditions).
60. See Barry Eichengreen, Taming Capital Flows, 28 WORLD DEV. 1105, 1113 (2000)
(Committee's use of peer pressure); Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, Introductory Note, Bank for
International Settlements: Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices'
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informal means of regulating member conduct are no less effective be-
cause of their informality.6' Even though Committee decisions do not
have legal effect, 62 in practice they are understood to bind those national
authorities represented among the Committee's membership.63
Sanctioning may also be supported by reciprocal fairness-that is,
the tendency of people to respond more cooperatively to friendly actions
than a rational choice model would predict and to be more vengeful in
response to hostile actions. 6' The risk of costly sanction may be a strong
65deterrent to those considering deviating from a group norm.
Reputation may also reinforce network norms.66 Acting consistently
with norms-based expectations may enhance a member's network
Consultative Paper on International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Stan-
dards, 30 INT'L L. MATERIALS 967, 969 (1991) ("One imagines that considerable peer
pressure is applied to any regulator refusing to go along with the consensus.").
61. "No punishment is levied for failing to establish laws that implement the [Accord],
and no rewards are proffered for implementing them. Nothing, that is, other than the ability to
participate with comfort in the continuing meetings of the [C]ommittee and to be recognized
as a country that meets standards established by the major commercial nations of the world.
That seems to be sufficient." Robert E. Barnett, How Peter Cooke Sowed the Seeds of Global
Regulation and Supervision, THE BANKERS, Nov./Dec. 1992, at 70.
62. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, History of the Basel Committee and
its Membership 1 (Oct. 2004), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.pdf [hereinafter History of the
Basel Committee] ("Committee... conclusions do not, and were never intended to, have legal
force.").
63. Charles Freeland, The Work of the Basle Committee, in 2 CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES
AFFECTING CENTRAL BANKS 231, 233 (1994).
64. Edwin M. Smith, Understanding Dynamic Obligations: Arms Control Agreements,
64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1549, 1595-98 (1991); Scott & Stephan, supra note 7, at 565-68.
65. Scott and Stephan argue that international elites are more likely to favor reciprocal
fairness, having survived a "selective process in which perceptions of weakness are not re-
warded. Even where advancement depends on convincing superiors of servility, the supplicant
still must present a credible image of mastery of his inferiors." Scott & Stephan, supra note 7,
at 618. Thus, elites are likely to be concerned about developing a reputation for weakness and
be willing to incur greater costs to punish those who treat them unfairly. Id. Yet not all net-
work elites possess those characteristics, and, in fact, they may be discouraged among senior
regulators in some states. See, e.g., Jong S. Jun & Hiromi Muto, The Hidden Dimensions of
Japanese Administration: Culture and Its Impact, 55 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 125, 126 (1995) (de-
scribing reciprocal junior-senior relationships in Japanese bureaucracies). A willingness to
incur greater costs in punishing, however, may be appropriate where a counterparty's breach
signals defection from a broader network norm. In that context, the counterparty may be con-
sidered to have defected from the network as a whole, with a corresponding increase in the
aggregate costs members are willing to bear to punish her. See Lisa Bernstein, Private Com-
mercial Law, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 108, 111
(Peter Newman ed., 1998) ("When market transactors share a common view about what con-
stitutes acceptable commercial behaviour, a given instance of misbehaviour will result in more
transactors imposing the sanction."). Cultural differences that vary the impact of norms-based
compliance, see supra note 59 and accompanying text, may become less relevant to the extent
network norms create a common frame of reference for network members.
66. Sunstein, Expressive Function, supra note 22, at 2032; David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming
in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1815 (2001) (noting the relationship among
norms, reputation, and shaming).
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reputation, increasing her influence within the group; conversely,
deviating from a norm may result in reputational loss. 67 Thus, even when
a member has a significant upfront incentive to defect, longer term gains
from cooperation (or losses from defection) may tip the balance in favor
of cooperation. 68 A bank regulator whose country fails to comply with
the Accord, for example, is likely to suffer a loss of reputation and
influence among network peers,69 which may in turn impair her future
career opportunities and her effectiveness in representing her state's
interests before other network members.70 That impact may extend
beyond network members to other, senior domestic actors involved in a
state's decision to defect.7' Accordingly, sanctions resulting from a
failure to comply with a network norm may be three-fold: to the network
member personally; to the domestic regime with which she is associated;
and to the state she represents.
Group standing is particularly important where, as in the banking in-
dustry, the group includes dominant actors in the field. The Federal
Reserve Board and the Bank of England, for example, are driving forces
on the Basel Committee and represent some of the largest financial mar-
kets in the world.72 Committee membership may facilitate access to
senior regulators in those markets, as well as provide insight into regula-
tory and market changes. Consequently, even where a central authority
to enforce norms is absent, disaggregated group membership and re-
peated interaction provide other means of control that can prove just as
effective.73
67. See Robert Axelrod, An Evolutionary Approach to Norms, 80 AM. POL. Sci. REV.
1095, 1107-08 (1986); Sunstein, Expressive Function, supra note 22, at 2032.
68. Guzman, supra note 12, at 1847-50.
69. Id. at 1881.
70. The impact of network standing on careers-and, in turn, the impact of network
norms and reputation on individual action-should not be underestimated. Noted one U.S.
trade negotiator, "'What I want to know if I negotiate with someone is: what ministry are you
from and what it takes for you to get promoted."' BRAITHWAITE & DRAHos, supra note 43, at
496.
71. See Scott & Stephan, supra note 7, at 584. A subsequent change in leadership, re-
sulting from the normal replacement of one political party with another, is unlikely to alter
that reputation. Id. at 584-85.
72. See Zaring, Informal Procedure, supra note 20, at 571. See also Beth A. Simmons,
The International Politics of Harmonization: The Case of Capital Market Regulation, 55
INT'L ORG. 589, 595-96 (2001) (stating that global financial regulation is notable for its
dominance by the U.S. markets), 601-05 (using the Accord as an example of market-based
incentives that encourage regulatory convergence supported by a dominant financial center).
73. See Aviram, supra note 41, at 1227 ("The greater the network benefits, the greater
the value conferred on the network member, and therefore the greater the cost of canceling the
membership in the network."). An important member of a network may be less threatened by a
risk of exclusion or decline in status if the network benefits from her membership. Id. Group
status, nevertheless, may be important to members who value the esteem of their foreign coun-
terparts over their superiors at home. A regulator's loyalty to her peers may increase as a result
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Domestic elites may also recognize (and network members will
have incentives to cause them to recognize) that rejection of a network
norm will result in sanctions that limit the effectiveness of a state's rep-
resentatives among peer regulators. If the impact is significant, those
representatives may have an incentive to implement that portion of a
norm which results in minimal sanction-weighing the costs and bene-
fits of adoption against those of defection. Resulting state compliance
may then reflect a balance between network benefits/sanctions on the
one hand and competing domestic interests on the other, complementing
the transnational legal process model that Koh describes."
The creation of a network norm, however, may not result in actual
compliance at the state level. It may simply result in a consensus among
network members, and network members only, about what should be
done. As the following section explains, network norms may imbue a
network member's actions with a particular meaning or clarity of
purpose within the network. Actual state compliance with a network
norm, however, may depend on politicians, bureaucrats, and others
"outside" the network who do not view compliance in the same light.6
of attendance at regular international meetings, the location of those meetings in areas that are
remote from her home agency, and subject matter specialization that is too technical for senior
managers to monitor. TONY PORTER, STATES, MARKETS AND REGIMES IN GLOBAL FINANCE 81
(1993).
74. Consider the two-level game metaphor for international negotiations. Two-level
games model the interaction between negotiations at the national and international levels and
illustrate how the interests of a negotiator may diverge from those of her domestic constitu-
ents. Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42
INT'L ORG. 427, 456-59 (1988). A negotiator, for example, may influence her state's domestic
agenda, in a way not otherwise possible at home, through agreements she reaches internation-
ally. Id. at 457. Likewise, in the exercise of discretion, a senior regulator may agree with her
foreign counterparts to implement standards that are inconsistent with certain domestic inter-
ests. In U.S.-Japanese trade negotiations, for example, gaiatsu (foreign pressure) by U.S.
representatives, pursuing interests aligned with those of some Japanese constituencies, may
have provided the "excuse" for domestic actors to cause change over the objection of other
local parties. See LEONARD J. SCHOPPA, BARGAINING WITH JAPAN 301 (1997).
75. Koh's description does not directly address the coercive effect of norms on state
compliance and so may be most apt where there already exists a domestic environment that
supports the relevant international norm. See George W. Downs, David M. Rocke & Peter N.
Barsoom, Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?, 50 INT'L
ORG. 379, 387 (1996) (suggesting that, in many cases, international commitments may reflect,
rather than influence, how states choose to act).
76. See Jeffrey T. Checkel, Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary
Europe, 43 INT'L STUD. Q. 83, 84 (1999) ("[D]omestic norms and domestic structure are
variables that intervene between systemic norms and national-level outcomes."); Haas, supra
note 24, at 46-49 (suggesting that domestic political costs may affect levels of compliance);
Scott & Stephan, supra note 7, at 583 (proposing that the ability of political elites to pursue
self-interested goals is affected by domestic government characteristics).
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Those differences may influence which norms are integrated, how they
are integrated, and whether the integration is successful.77
2. Norms and Signaling
The specific standards set out in the Accord support, and in turn are
supported by, abstract norms of cooperation among global regulators.
Richard McAdams' dichotomy between "abstract" and "concrete" norms
helps describe this relationship. As McAdams explains, abstract norms
broadly define appropriate behavior, such as "friends should be loyal."
Concrete norms, in turn, provide narrow direction on what actions sat-
isfy that abstract norm, such as listening attentively to a friend's troubles,
watering her plants when she is away, or driving her home when she is
intoxicated.7 ' Each set of norms reinforces the other: abstract norms pro-
vide the framework within which concrete norms are introduced and
understood, and concrete norms demonstrate and define abstract norms
among network members.79
A preexisting norm of cooperation among regulators has provided
states with a strong incentive to enter into global instruments like the
Accord.0 As one senior Federal Reserve official observed, Japan's regu-
lators adopted the Accord because "'they realize[d] it [was] in their
longer-term interest to be viewed as a cooperative member of the inter-
national community.' ,,81 Diplomatic professionals also see regulatory
cooperation as an end in itself and support agencies willing to enter into
instruments like the Accord because doing so reinforces cooperation
among global regulators.82
Consequently, using McAdams' formulation, we can understand an
action such as implementing the Accord to be perceived among global
regulators as a concrete expression of an abstract network norm: the Ac-
cord supports cooperation by reinforcing levels of interaction among
network members and is itself supported by an international norm of
77. See Checkel, supra note 76, at 86-90.
78. McAdams, supra note 11, at 382.
79. Id. at 383-84. See also Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 1276-78 (describing "concreti-
zation" of normative standards).
80. Macey, supra note 34, at 1373-74. As Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes
have described, states "must submit to the pressures that international regulations impose."
Failing to do so may affect future relationships and good standing among peer nations, a
"critical factor" in ensuring compliance with international agreements. CHAYES & CHAYES,
SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 8, at 27 (citation omitted).
81. SOLOMON, supra note 50, at 424 (quoting an undisclosed senior Federal Reserve
official).
82. Macey, supra note 34, at 1373-74 ("Cooperation in the international sphere is a
form of global social norm.").
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cooperation.83 Implementing the Accord may signal a network member's
willingness to cooperate with others" and, in turn, be tied to network
standing, status, and self-esteem in ways that would not occur outside
the network. 5 In that respect, a network norm can give particular mean-
ing to concrete actions by attaching new values to them86-with the
result that network members are induced to behave consistently with that
norm or risk sanction for failing to do so.87
Since norms may vary from network to network, the impact on repu-
tation of an action within one set of network norms may not be the same
83. This analysis may better explain the "implicit" state obligations that Andrew
Guzman has observed. Using the Accord as an example, Guzman posits that a state may suffer
reputational damage if it deviates from a standard with which it has complied for a number of
years, even where that standard is nonbinding, on the theory that others have come to rely on
that compliance. Guzman, supra note 12, at 1863-64. While a reliance explanation may apply
to states with large financial markets, it is less convincing in the case of less financially sig-
nificant states. Using this Article's analysis, a state may instead be understood to adopt the
Accord in order to signal cooperation to others, consistent with abstract and concrete norms
developed among network members. Later defection, irrespective of market size, may signal
to others a failure to cooperate, with resulting network sanctions (including a loss of status and
reputation), irrespective of the Accord's legally nonbinding status.
84. See EIc A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NoRsS 18-27 (2000) [hereinafter POSNER,
LAw/SociAL NORMS].
85. See Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 11, at 925-27 ("The meaning of acts is very
much a function of context and culture."). The South African investor boycott of the mid-
1980s offers a real-world illustration of how similar actions can communicate different infor-
mation to different people. Calls for stockholders to sell shares of companies doing business in
South Africa and subsequent investor activism are often credited with the demise of South
African apartheid. In fact, while investor boycotts brought substantial, usually unwanted, at-
tention to companies doing business in South Africa, the effects of that pressure on stock
prices were fairly modest. See William H. Kaempfer, James A. Lehman & Anton D. Lowen-
berg, Divestment, Investment Sanctions, and Disinvestment: An Evaluation of Anti-apartheid
Policy Instruments, 41 INT'L ORG. 457, 460-64 (1987); Siew Hong Teoh, Ivo Welch & C. Paul
Wazzan, The Effect of Socially Activist Investment Policies on the Financial Markets: Evi-
dence from the South African Boycott, 72 J. Bus. 35, 38-39 (1999). A company's decision to
do business in South Africa may not have communicated the same information to all inves-
tors-for some, doing business in South Africa may have raised questions about management
responsibility; and, for others, doing business in South Africa may have evidenced manage-
ment opportunism and corporate stability (or provided no information at all). Consequently,
the downward pressure on share prices from sales by activist investors was largely offset by
purchases by others. Id. at 77.
86. Sunstein, Expressive Function, supra note 22, at 2022 ("The social meanings of
actions are very much a function of existing social norms."). Robert Jervis's insights are also
relevant here. See ROBERT JERvis, THE LOGIC OF IMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 18,
21, 66 (1970) (defining signals as words or actions intended to influence perceptions that can
be sent by both deceptive and honest states). As Jervis notes, "signals depend for their effec-
tiveness on agreement, usually implicit, as to the meanings of particular behaviors. Signals are
not natural; they are conventional. That is, they consist of statements and actions that the
sender and receiver have endowed with meaning in order to accomplish certain goals:' Id. at
139.
87. See Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 11, at 917-18; Posner, Inefficient Norms,
supra note 11, at 1699-1701.
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in a different network." The analysis in this Article suggests that varia-
tions in a state's reputation may reflect differences across networks in
member composition, network relationships, and norms that affect what
information a particular action signals.89 For example, states may demon-
strate varying levels of compliance with international agreements,9 but
deviation in one field (such as the environment) may not affect a state's
network relationships in another (such as trade).9'
When compliance with a network standard imposes opportunity or
other costs, the act of complying may communicate to network members
a state's willingness to forego short-term gains in favor of longer-term
cooperation.92 Simply adopting a standard, however, may cost little, par-
ticularly when monitoring and independent enforcement are kept to a
93minimum. More significant, in those circumstances, may be a mem-
ber's decision not to adopt a network norm.94 Among network members,
88. See JERVIS, supra note 86, at 141 ("[F]or these or any other distinctions to be sig-
nificant for signaling they must be salient for both parties. It may be difficult to be sure what is
obvious to another, especially when he does not share your history, values, norms, and theo-
ies... ").
89. See Sunstein, Expressive Function, supra note 11, at 2040. David Moore posits that
a state looking for a long-term supply of agricultural imports is more likely to enter into an
agreement with a state that observes international human rights standards, since doing so sig-
nals a lower discount rate and greater propensity to cooperate in the longer term. Moore, supra
note 16, at 886-87. However, states are not unitary, and different actors (for sender and re-
ceiver) may interpret similar actions in different ways. Thus, an action that signals cooperation
in one network (for example, in human rights) may not necessarily have the same meaning in
another (for example, in trade). See also Elmer J. Schaefer, Predicting Defection, 36 U. RICH.
L. REv. 443, 462-63 (2002) ("The ability to comply with a norm and the importance of doing
so will vary from norm to norm and from situation to situation."). Of course, states may tie the
two together, for example, by imposing trade sanctions as a means to punish defection from a
human rights norm, but that would be less the result of reputational impact in a non-human
rights area and more a reflection of the other states' strategy of linking issues to punish a de-
fector. See David W. Leebron, Linkages, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 5, 12-15 (2002) (describing
strategic linkage of issues and sanctions).
90. Haas, supra note 24, at 44; George W. Downs & Michael A. Jones, Reputation,
Compliance, and International Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 104-06, 108 (2002).
91. See id. at 109 ("[E]xamples of a state's defection from an agreement in one area
(for example, environment) jeopardizing its reputation in every other area (for example, trade
and security) are virtually nonexistent in the literature."). But see Colin B. Picker, Reputa-
tional Fallacies in International Law: A Comparative Review of United States and Canadian
Trade Actions, 30 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 67, 106-10 (2004) (Overarching state reputations may
spill over into the minds of officials, who believe it represents a state "better than their indi-
vidual perceptions based on a limited level of interaction.").
92. Moore, supra note 16, at 883-84.
93. Id. at 902-04. This is not always the case. For Japan, adopting the Accord was
costly, since it introduced a new form of banking regulation. See infra note 157 and accompa-
nying text.
94. See POSNER, LAW/SOCIAL NORMS, supra note 84, at 189-90 ("[I]f [a] seller tells
you that he sometimes cheats, while all other sellers deny ever cheating, you might as well
take your chances with another seller."); Lessig, Social Meaning, supra note 11, at 998 (point-
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that action may signal the defecting state's unwillingness or inability to
cooperate, perhaps due to its unique position or strongly held political
preferences.95 Accordingly, states have strong incentives to accede to a
network standard, even when actual compliance is lower.96 Dissident ac-
tivity, if it occurs, is more likely to take place outside of public view.
97
To be credible, however, a signal must be costly or otherwise capa-
ble of separating those who support a network standard from those who
do not.98 If implementing the standard costs little, the pool of states sig-
naling support for that standard may include both compliers and
mimickers. 99 That signal will become more credible to the extent that
others can observe later compliance (or defection)' - - a greater prob-
ability of verification will increase the associated signaling costs,
differentiating complying states that are willing to incur those costs from
mimicking states that are not. '° Yet, for a signal to be costly, a state may
not be required to incur expenditures up front. A risk of future expense,
or future sanction in the event of noncompliance, may be sufficiently
costly to differentiate those who can credibly signal support from those
who cannot.'0
3. Norms and Levels of Compliance
As noted earlier, network relationships have become increasingly im-
portant for the world's regulators, facilitating increased levels of
ing out that even slight deviations, when repeated, may signal a more fundamental individual
disorder).
95. SLAUGHTER, supra note 1, at 182.
96. Moore, supra note 16, at 903.
97. Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 11, at 924.
98. POSNER, LAw/SOcIAL NORMS, supra note 84, at 19-20; Moore, supra note 16, at
883-84, 903. A familiar example is the use of education to signal employee productivity. Ob-
taining an education can be costly in terms of money, time, and effort. People who are highly
productive, however, may find obtaining an education to be less costly and so more readily
incur that cost, credibly signaling their productivity to prospective employers. Jack L. Gold-
smith & Eric A. Posner, Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International Relations: A Rational
Choice Perspective, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 123-24 (2002); Moore, supra note 16, at 883.
99. Moore, supra note 16, at 903.
100. Whether a state is observed to defect from a standard may result from monitoring,
as a by-product of other activity, or may be due to the state's actions being observable at mini-
mal cost. McAdams, supra note 11, at 361-62.
101. - POSNER, LAW/SOCIAL NORMS, supra note 84, at 190-92.
102. In that respect, the costs associated with a network signal may differ from those in
the education paradigm used by others, more closely resembling the signal associated with a
money-back guarantee. See Sridhar Moorthy & Kannan Srinivasan, Signaling Quality with a
Money-Back Guarantee: The Role of Transaction Costs, 14 MARKETING Sci. 442, 443-44
(1995). Upfront expenditures are minimal in the case of money-back guarantees. Nevertheless,
a lower quality seller is more likely over time to incur greater transaction costs than a higher
quality seller. Recognizing this, she is less likely to offer a money-back guarantee in the first
place, providing buyers with a credible signal of product quality. Id. at 464.
Spring 2006]
Michigan Journal of International Law
interaction and long-term relationships among senior regulators in differ-
ent countries who seek to keep pace with the growing globalization of the
industries they oversee.' 3 Relational theory posits that parties in a long-
term relationship are more likely to value that relationship over individual
differences, developing norms of exchange and entering into flexible
agreements whose terms may be varied over time as circumstances
change.'04 It should be no surprise, then, that many of the informal interna-
tional instruments entered into among regulators, sometimes known as
"soft law" agreements,' 5 reflect relational characteristics.' °6
Soft law instruments, like relational contracts generally, tend to be
drafted flexibly, allowing for the modification of performance over time
based on the parties' mutual expectations and changing circumstances. '°7
Flexibility is a key feature, "permit[ting] a step forward because [the
agreements] do not prevent steps backward."' 8 Norms and the parties'
103. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
104. Jay M. Feinman, The Significance of Contract Theory, 58 U. CN. L. REV. 1283,
1299-1302 (1990).
105. As Judge Baxter has observed, those instruments are now a "vast sub-structure of
intergovernmental paper" R. R. Baxter, International Law in "Her Infinite Variety," 29 INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. 549, 556 (1980). There is no precise definition of "soft law." See Joseph Gold,
Strengthening the Soft International Law of Exchange Arrangements, 77 Am. J. INT'L L. 443,
443 (1983); Tadeusz Gruchalla-Wesierski, A Framework for Understanding "Soft Law," 30
MCGILL L. J. 37, 44 (1984). Nor is there consensus over whether it constitutes a distinct
source of law. See ANTHONY AuST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 44 (2000); Prosper
Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 413, 414 n.7
(1983). Broadly defined, soft law includes legally nonbinding instruments (such as accords,
guidelines, principles, declarations, codes of practice, recommendations, and programs) and
provisions in legally binding instruments that are vague or weak. I have defined "soft law"
here to include only legally nonbinding instruments, since the Accord falls into the first cate-
gory. See NORTON, supra note 5, at 255-62; Lawrence L.C. Lee, The Basle Accords as Soft
Law: Strengthening International Banking Supervision, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 39-40 (1998).
106. See Edith Brown Weiss, Understanding Compliance With International Environ-
mentalAgreements: The Baker's Dozen Myths, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 1555, 1570 (1999) (noting
the relevance of relational analysis to legally nonbinding agreements). International law schol-
ars have also long recognized the relevance of relational theory to treaty compliance. See
Anthony D'Amato, The Path of International Law, 1 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 1, 12 n.8 (1995)
(noting that "[t]he 'relational' theory of contracts has a lot to learn from treaties" as well).
107. On relational contracts, see IAN R. MACNEIL, CONTRACTS: EXCHANGE TRANSAC-
TIONS AND RELATIONS 13 (2d ed. 1978); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court:
Rethinking the Code's Search for Imminent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1765, 1787-
89 (1996); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L.
REV. 1089, 1091 (1981); and, on soft law agreements, see Anthony Aust, The Theory and
Practice of Informal International Instruments, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 787, 789 (1986);
Michael Bothe, Legal and Non-Legal Norms-A Meaningful Distinction in International Rela-
tions?, 11 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 65, 86 (1980).
108. Frieder Roessler, Law, De Facto Agreements and Declarations of Principle in In-
ternational Economic Relations, 21 GER. Y.B. INT'L L. 27, 54 (1978). Soft law instruments
also provide procedural benefits to regulators, including the ability to enter into agreements
without legislative approval or public notice. AUST, supra note 105, at 35-38; Gruchalla-
Wesierski, supra note 105, at 41-43.
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practices over the life of the relationship become essential to defining
their respective obligations." Focusing on only the terms of an instru-
ment, without also considering these norms, "underestimate[s] the
practical obligations imposed by relational forces. '"" Enforcement also
depends on the relationship's importance to the parties. Due to the im-
portance of networks, regulators generally decline to risk network
sanctions that may impair their relationships."' Consequently, as noted
earlier, Committee members consider the Accord and other Committee
decisions to be binding obligations despite their legally nonbinding
status."1
2
A relational approach suggests that network norms may vary the
terms of agreements among regulators. Accordingly, a state may deviate
from the black letter of a network standard without being considered a
defector, so long as its actions are consistent with the understanding of
network members.' These members may permit deviation under
circumstances that are not fully set out in the instrument or apparent to
109. See Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries, 94 Nw.
U. L. REV. 877, 879-84 (2000).
110. Smith, supra note 64, at 1587.
Ill. In general, international regulators take soft law agreements seriously. See Louis
HENKIN, How NATIONs BEHAVE 56 (1968); Gold, supra note 105, at 443. They rely on these
agreements to create "moral" or "political" commitments that agreement terms will be mutu-
ally respected. See Oscar Schachter, The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International
Agreements, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 296, 304 (1977); Gruchalla-Wesierski, supra note 105, at 46-
48. Failing to comply risks lowering the "credit-rating" of the relevant government or ministry
and upsetting existing cooperation. Baxter, supra note 105, at 556. It may also result in politi-
cal or other sanctions, such as reciprocal noncompliance by the non-breaching party or a
refusal to cooperate on other matters. AusT, supra note 105, at 39; Marian Nash (Leich), Con-
temporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L.
515, 517-18 (1994) (quoting a memorandum by the U.S. State Department Assistant Legal
Adviser for Treaty Affairs).
112. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
113. The pre-World War I gold standard, for example, reflected norms that evolved
among Europe's central bankers and capital markets investors. That standard, evidenced by
unwritten "rules of the game," was intended to peg the value of the world's principal curren-
cies to a fixed weight of gold, effectively linking them through a fixed exchange rate. Ronald
I. McKinnon, The Rules of the Game: International Money in Historical Perspective, 31 J.
ECON. LIT. 1, 3-6 (1993). Over time, capital markets investors came to see adherence to the
gold standard as a signal of financial and political stability, in effect a "good housekeeping
seal of approval" that evidenced a state's commitment to limited currency intervention. Mi-
chael D. Bordo & Hugh Rockoff, The Gold Standard as a "Good Housekeeping Seal of
Approval," 56 J. ECON. HIST. 389, 390-91 (1996). Central bankers and investors, however,
came to recognize specific cases of emergency that excused deviation. Those circumstances
included war, financial crisis, and shocks to the terms of trade. After a return of normalcy,
states were required to return to gold convertibility. Id. at 392-94. Those that deviated in ac-
cordance with the rule generally were not penalized. States that deviated outside the scope of
the rule, however, were understood to no longer comply and risked sanction (for example, by
investors who later declined to buy their debt). Id. at 393.
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actors outside the network."1 4 Reactions to that deviation may differ-
with network members understanding that less-than-full compliance still
signals support of the relevant norm, even when others outside the
network see it is as a defection. Particular behavior that evidences an
abstract norm may evolve over time as the costs and benefits of that
behavior change-thus affecting, in the case of regulatory networks,
which standards evidence network cooperation (such as the Accord) and
which levels of compliance are acceptable to network members.' If this
is accurate, then traditional concepts of "compliance" may not apply
internationally; rather, what constitutes compliance may vary across
networks and over time, reflecting differences in norms.' 6
C. Principal Implications
This Article's new approach to understanding state compliance pos-
its that network norms may influence the outlook of senior regulators,
affecting the actions they take on behalf of states and, in turn, impacting
levels of state compliance. Norms also provide particular meaning to a
member's actions that may or may not be understood by those outside
the network, signaling support of a network norm to members even when
actual compliance with the black letter is lower.
This new approach has a number of important implications. It sug-
gests that, in certain circumstances, network forces which affect state
action may permit levels of compliance that differ from those understood
by actors outside the network. Differences in perspective may result in
network members understanding compliance or defection from a global
standard differently than, for example, market actors-who may impose
market costs even in the absence of regulatory network sanction." 7 It also
114. See Bilder, supra note 48, at 69 (Officials may regard failure to comply completely
with a global standard as "tacitly understood by all the participants as part of their joint expec-
tational framework.").
115. See McAdams, supra note 11, at 383-85.
116. As Richard Bilder has noted, the understanding among officials that a failure to
comply is not a breach may make "attempts to analyze their behavior in terms of formal no-
tions of 'compliance' ... unsatisfactory indeed." Bilder, supra note 48, at 69. Chayes and
Chayes have also noted, in the international arena, that "acceptable" compliance may differ
from full compliance, "reflect[ing] the perspectives and interests of the participants in an on-
going political process, rather than some external, scientifically or market-validated standard."
CHAYES & CHAYES, SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 8, at 17, 19-20. See also Chayes & Chayes, On
Compliance, supra note 1, at 201 (asserting that "the 'acceptable level of compliance' is sub-
ject to broad variance across regimes, times, and occasions").
117. Beth Simmons has considered the role of market forces in state compliance, posit-
ing that compliance in some instances may be enforced by competitive market forces. State
compliance with an IMF standard, in her illustration, signaled a commitment to current ac-
count policy liberalization to those companies potentially willing to do business in that state.
States that failed to comply risked the possibility of market actors doing business elsewhere.
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suggests norms may permit members to vary compliance with network
standards, potentially resulting in inconsistent levels of compliance."
8
Unless enforcement is uniform, the practical implementation of stan-
dards may vary from state to state. Japan's experience with the Accord,
described in the next Part, provides some illustration.'' 9
This approach also highlights potential conflicts between a global
regulator's role as a state representative and her status as a member of a
regulatory network. As national representatives, regulators are expected
to pursue state interests at the international level.'20 Compliance with a
network norm, however, may raise a regulator's status among her net-
work peers, even (or particularly) when it competes with domestic
interests-potentially causing a conflict between a regulator's state re-
sponsibilities and her network interests.' 2 ' As network members,
regulators are also expected to implement and enforce network standards
at home.' 2  Competing domestic interests, however, may influence how
those standards are implemented and enforced, with actual application
varying from state to state. Greater oversight at the domestic level may
balance some of these competing factors, 2 3 but the potential for con-
flict-and resulting variations in compliance-underscores the need to
Beth A. Simmons, International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in
International Monetary Affairs, 94 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 819, 821 (2000).
118. See Cally Jordan & Giovanni Majnoni, Financial Regulatory Harmonization and
the Globalization of Finance 16 (World Bank, Pol'y Res. Working Paper No. 2919, 2002)
("Consistency of interpretation of [soft] standards and codes across jurisdictions with different
cultural and legal backgrounds cannot be taken for granted.").
119. National variations in compliance may be particularly complex for multinational
companies subject to supervision by multiple regulators in different jurisdictions. See The New
Basel Accord: Sound Regulation or Crushing Complexity?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Domestic and International Monetary Policy, Trade, and Technology, H. Comm. on Financial
Services, 108th Cong. 70-71 (2003) [hereinafter The New Basel Accord] (comments by D.
Wilson Ervin, Managing Director and Head of Strategic Risk Management, Credit Suisse First
Boston).
120. See Singer, supra note 34, at 532-33, 535 (noting that legislators and financial
regulators are engaged in a principal-agent relationship, with regulatory discretion constrained
by the preferences of elected officials).
121. See BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 43, at 462-63 ("[D]iplomatic demonstra-
tions of independence from the economic interests of their own firm" may enhance network
reputations of industry engineers developing global standards.).
122. See Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard Stewart, The Emergence of Global
Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 36 (2005) (Procedures developed by
global regimes seek to "place domestic regulatory bodies and officials in an additional role as
agents of the relevant global regime, and seek to make them in some way responsible for
compliance with it.").
123. Note, in this regard, U.S. legislative efforts to require U.S. bank regulators to come
to a consensus on positions to be taken at the Basel Committee and, if no consensus can be
reached, to defer to the Treasury Secretary. Zaring, Informal Procedure, supra note 20, at
598-99.
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consider more closely the growing body of international administrative
law and procedure and new scholarship in this area.1
24
II. THE BASEL ACCORD AND JAPAN'S EXPERIENCE
In this Part, I briefly summarize the Accord's history and Japan's ex-
perience in complying with its standards and then use that summary to
illustrate the relationship among international norms, signaling, and
compliance in line with this Article's analytical approach.25
Japan's compliance with the Accord has been checkered-although
initially considered by Japan's regulators and bankers to impose man-
ageable costs, compliance became increasingly difficult as Japan's
economy weakened. 26 Nevertheless, implementing the Accord's mini-
mum standard (an 8% ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets) has
signaled to other financial regulators Japan's willingness to cooperate
globally, even where its overall compliance with the black letter of the
Accord has been lower. As Japan's experience indicates, failing to im-
plement a network standard may result in network sanctions, providing
members with strong incentives to send the "right" signal. Japan's ex-
perience may also illustrate how network norms can allow for lower
levels of compliance to be accepted by network members under certain
circumstances.
A. The Basel Committee and the Accord
Global bureaucrats are increasingly coordinating the formulation and
implementation of national financial standards and regulation, reflecting
the growing interdependence of the world's financial markets' 27 and the
potential cross-border impact of banking and other financial crises. 28 As
124. See Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra note 122, at 14-28 (defining the scope of
global administrative law, its sources, institutional mechanisms through which it is being ap-
plied and developed, and emerging principles and tools).
125. A complete analysis of the factors that affected Japan's banking industry, and later
decision to recapitalize its banks, is beyond the scope of this Article. My analysis here is lim-
ited to those points that illustrate the importance of norms and signaling in network
relationships and compliance.
126. Originally, 91 Japanese banks adopted the 8% minimum applicable to internation-
ally active banks. See Analyst Urges Changes in Banks'Strategies, JIJl PRESS TICKER SERVICE,
Dec. 19, 1990. As of March 31, 2004, only 44 Japanese banks were reported to have regula-
tory capital ratios in excess of 8%. See Ranking: Top 100 Japanese Banks: 2005, THE BANKER
(online), http://www.thebanker-database.co.uk/rankings.asp.
127. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, High-level Principles for the Cross-
Border Implementation of the New Accord 4 (Aug. 2003), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsI00.
pdf; Int'l Monetary Fund, Financial Sector Regulation: Issues and Gaps 29 (Aug. 4, 2004),
http://www.imf.org/external/np/mfd/2004/eng/080404.htm [hereinafter Issues and Gaps].
128. Picciotto, supra note 5, at 1045-46.
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a result, a "consensus" on global standards and codes of conduct aimed
at achieving increased financial stability and stronger financial systems
is developing among regulators. 29 Much of this coordination has been
evidenced by legally nonbinding, "soft law" instruments among global
bureaucrats.30
A showpiece of soft law coordination, the Accord was finalized in
1988, with effect from 1992 (for Japanese banks, from March 1993, the
end of their fiscal year), under the auspices of the Basel Committee. The
Committee's principal purpose has been to foster international cooperation
on supervisory standards, practices, and guidelines for banks, supporting a
gradual convergence towards common regulation and approaches to su-
pervision.' The Committee also works to improve contacts among global
banking regulators, acting as a joint decision-making body, a forum for the
exchange of information, a means of coordinating activities, and a place to
develop senior regulatory relationships.
32
Committee organization is fluid and informal, partly reflecting its
broad and flexible constitution as a body of regulators instead of states."
Decisions are made by consensus, rather than through a formal one
state/one vote process, often permitting regulators from the wealthiest
members to play a greater role in developing Committee standards. " In
addition, "an important, though necessarily unpublicised, element in the
Committee's regular work" is the development of close personal contacts
among regulators in different countries.' These relationships are fos-
tered, in part, through the exclusive nature of Committee membership-
129. See Joseph J. Norton, The Modem Genre of Infrastructural Law Reform: The Legal
and Practical Realities-The Case of Banking Reform in Thailand, 55 SMU L. REv. 235, 238
(2002).
130. Mario Giovanoli, Reflections on International Financial Standards as "Soft Law",
in 37 ESSAYS IN INT'L FIN. & ECON. L., at 5 (The London Institute of International Banking,
Finance and Development Law 2002).
131. Ronnie J. Phillips & Richard D. Johnson, Regulating International Banking: Ra-
tionale, History, and Future Prospects, in THE NEW FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE: BANKING
REGULATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 9 (2000).
132. PORTER, supra note 73, at 56-57, 72-73; Hayward, supra note 5, at 790-91. Until
recently, the Committee sponsored educational conferences for regulators from around the
world in order to enhance relations and promote the globalization of Committee standards. See
History of the Basel Committee, supra note 62, at 4-5. In addition, the Committee coordinates
with securities and insurance regulators internationally through the Joint Forum established in
1996. See BIS, Joint Forum, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/jfabout.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2006).
Committee members also interact through overlapping membership in other organizations. See
supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
133. Zaring, Informal Procedure, supra note 20, at 569-70.
134. Zaring, Other Means, supra note 45, at 302, 322-23.
135. History of the Basel Committee, supra note 62, at 5. "As one regulator put it, 'The
most important document to flow from the [Committee] was the telephone book of all the
involved regulators.'" Barnett, supra note 61, at 69.
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limited publicity, meetings that are closed to the public, and restrictions
on membership.
13 6
The Committee has also sought to avoid publicity, preferring to re-
main in the "'hidden secret world of the supervisory continent.' ,137 That
secrecy is itself remarkable, allowing the Committee to deliberate free
from outside pressures while suggesting a high degree of institutional
control over individual members.'38
The Accord was the product of negotiation among Committee mem-
bers,'3 9 spurred by a bilateral U.S.-U.K. accord (later including Japan)
that was aimed both at overcoming resistance to a common capital stan-
dard and blocking a competing standard in the European Community.'
40
Neither the Federal Reserve Board nor the Bank of England demanded
that other states accede to their agreement.14 ' Nevertheless, deliberation
by other Committee members took place under the very long shadow of
the U.S.-U.K. alliance. After Japan joined, it became clear that members
needed to strike an agreement quickly or risk having the world's princi-
pal financial markets announce standards to which they were not a
party.141
The Accord was hailed as one of the most important events in the
coordination of international banking regulation. 143 Considered to be
"more robust and effective" than many international treaties,'" over 100
136. NORTON, supra note 5, at 260 (conjecturing that Committee exclusivity has added
to its potency); Zaring, Informal Procedure, supra note 20, at 555-56 (citing the Committee's
lack of publicity and limited public access).
137. PORTER, supra note 73, at 66 (quoting a former Committee chairman). Perhaps in
order to enhance the legitimacy of its decisions, the Committee has started to circulate them
publicly and also welcome public comment on its proposals. Zaring, Informal Procedure,
supra note 20, at 556-57.
138. PORTER, supra note 73, at 66. See also id. at 80 ("The Committee's esprit de corps
is an indication of a high degree of peer socialization.").
139. Freeland, supra note 63, at 233.
140. KAPSTEIN, GLOBAL ECONOMY, supra note 22, at 113. Initial work in Europe on
capital adequacy started about a decade earlier. PORTER, supra note 73, at 64.
141. Secret coordination, however, among the United States, the United Kingdom, and
(eventually) Japan was seen by some as a "bombshell" that crippled the cooperative spirit that
had developed among Committee members. PORTER, supra note 73, at 68.
142. KAPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 115. See also James K. Sebenius, Challenging
Conventional Explanations of International Cooperation: Negotiation Analysis and the Case of
Epistemic Communities, 46 INT'L ORG. 323, 345-46 (1992) (stating that the U.S., U.K., and
Japanese coalition shaped the perceived zone of possible agreement among other G-10 states
and so strongly influenced the outcome).
143. Joel P. Trachtman, Recent Initiatives in International Financial Regulation and
Goals of Competitiveness, Effectiveness, Consistency and Cooperation, 12 Nw. J. INT'L L &
Bus. 241, 288 (1991).
144. Andrew Crockett, Thoughts on the New Financial Architecture, in MONETARY POL-
ICY, CAPITAL FLOWS AND EXCHANGE RATES: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF MAXWELL FRY 78, 86
(2002) (At the time, Andrew Crockett was the General Manager of the BIS.).
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states'4 5 have adopted the Accord's minimum 8% ratio of capital to risk-
weighted assets.'" None of these states was obligated to do so-in fact,
even though the Accord was endorsed by the G-10 central bank gover-
nors, 147 it did not bind their respective governments, and in theory, any
one of them could and can defect from the Accord at any time and for
any reason.
Interpretation of the Accord has remained flexible, reflecting its rela-
tional nature and allowing for the adjustment of Accord standards in
response to new problems. As a senior Committee member commented,
"the primary objective of strengthening the capital of international banks
took precedence over the letter of the [Accord]. Such a robust attitude
would have been much more difficult to enforce had the agreement been
drafted in precise legal language.'41 8 As a result, the Accord has relied on
network relations and sanctions for enforcement (and, as necessary,
145. Patricia Jackson et al., Capital Requirements and Bank Behaviour: The Impact of
the Basle Accord 1 (Basle Comm. on Banking Supervision, Working Paper No. 1, 1999)
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs-wp01.pdf; see also Andrew Crockett, Gen. Manager, BIS, Inter-
national Standard Setting in Financial Supervision, Lecture at the Cass Business School, City
University, London (Feb. 5, 2003) (transcript available at http://www.bis.org/speeches/
sp030205.htm) (noting that Committee recommendations are almost universally applied by
Committee members and by non-member states).
146. The Accord establishes a general framework for bank capital based on credit risk,
intending to create an equity cushion for banks in order to enhance their stability. It sets a
target ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets of 8% for internationally active banks, of which
core capital (Tier 1) must constitute at least 4 percent, and supplementary capital (Tier 2) is
admitted up to an amount equal to Tier 1 capital. Accord, supra note 13, at 1 14, 44. In the
numerator, Tier 1 capital is comprised of equity capital-ordinary shares/common stock and
non-cumulative perpetual preferred stock (excluding cumulative preferred stock)-and dis-
closed reserves from after-tax retained earnings. Id. at 14. Subject to certain conditions, Tier
2 capital includes revaluation and general loan loss reserves, hybrid debt capital securities, and
long-term subordinated debt. Id. at I 15-23. The Accord requires certain items to be de-
ducted from capital, such as goodwill, investments in certain unconsolidated subsidiaries, and
holdings of capital issued by other banks or deposit-taking institutions (as determined by the
relevant banking authority). Id. at TJ 24-27. In the denominator, a bank's assets are multiplied
by a weighting coefficient reflecting credit risk; for example, G-10 government debt is
weighted 0 percent, G-10 bank debt is weighted 20 percent, residential mortgage loans are
weighted 50 percent, and other debt, including corporate debt and the debt of non-G-10 gov-
ernments, is weighted 100 percent. Id. at Annex 2. The Accord also assigns weights to certain
off-balance sheet items converted to credit risk equivalents (subject to limited discretion by the
relevant banking authority). Id. at §§ 42-43, Annex 3. A 1996 amendment to the Accord, ef-
fective in 1998, also required banks to hold capital for trading-related market risks and
organization-wide commodity and foreign exchange exposures based upon a value-at-risk
(VaR) measurement. The amendment added a third tier of capital comprised of short-term
subordinated debt used only to cover market risk. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,
Amendment to the Capital Accord to Incorporate Market Risks (Jan. 1996, updated to Apr.
1998), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc222.pdf.
147. See Simmons, supra note 72, at 603-04.
148. Freeland, supra note 63, at 233 (the author was Deputy Secretary of the Basel Su-
pervisors' Committee).
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modification), as well as on social pressure-the commitment of mem-
bers and the pressure that peers may exert in the event of breach.
49
Notwithstanding its success, the Accord has raised some concerns.
Even before taking into account the somewhat arbitrary selection of 8%
as the Accord's minimum requirement, '5° it is not clear that stringent
capital regulation correlates closely with bank development, perform-
ance, or stability.' 5' There is some evidence the Accord has increased
international bank risk.52 Some also claim its standards caused banks in
the United States and Japan to reduce lending, contracting available
credit "'53 and weakening macroeconomic performance during the 1990s.'
54
Discretion and national differences in implementing the Accord, as well
as forbearance in enforcement, have also been handicaps. 5  Conse-
quently, there are a number of substantive reasons why a state might
consider foregoing adoption of the Accord. Still, the Accord's standard is
the acknowledged international benchmark of bank solvency, with 8%
149. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text. Compliance with the Accord has
been monitored by Committee members on an informal, decentralized basis. See NORTON,
supra note 5, at 241; Zaring, Other Means, supra note 45, at 290. The Committee periodically
surveys members on their progress with implementation and has announced plans to assume a
greater monitoring role in the future. Zaring, Informal Procedure, supra note 20, at 558.
150. "'That figure was seat-of-the-pants stuff,' admits Peter Cooke, the former Bank of
England official who chaired the [Committee] that hammered out the [Accord] . David
Fairlamb, Beyond Capital, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Aug. 1994, at 42.
151. See James R. Barth, Gerard Caprio, Jr. & Ross Levine, Bank Regulation and Super-
vision: What Works Best?, 13 JOURNAL OF FIN. INTERMEDIATION 205, 244-45 (2004).
152. See Terry A. Marsh & Jean-Michel Paul, BIS Capital Regulations and Japanese
Banks' Bad Loan Problems 37 (Columbia Bus. Sch., Ctr. on Japanese Econ. and Bus., Work-
ing Paper No. 131, 1997), http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/japan/research/workingpapers95_97
(noting that the Accord provided incentives to increase loan portfolio riskiness); Myung-Sun
Kim & William Kross, The Impact of the 1989 Change in Bank Capital Standards on Loan
Loss Provisions and Loan Write-offs, 25 J. OF ACCT. & ECON. 69, 71 (1998) (finding that
banks with low capital lowered loan loss provisioning after new standards took effect). Bank
regulatory capital arbitrage has also increased capital levels with little reduction in overall
economic risk. See David Jones, Emerging Problems with the Basel Capital Accord: Regula-
tory Capital Arbitrage and Related Issues, 24 J. BANKING & FIN. 35, 36 (2000).
153. See Kazuo Ogawa & Shin-ichi Kitasaka, Bank Lending in Japan: Its Determinants
and Macroeconomic Implications 21-28 (The Inst. of Soc. and Econ. Research., Osaka Univ.,
Discussion Paper No. 505, 2000), http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2000/dpO505.pdf.
But see David Woo, In Search of "Capital Crunch ": Supply Factors Behind the Credit Slow-
down in Japan 15-17 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 99/3, 1999) (concluding that
the credit crunch in 1997 resulted from increased financial system distress, increased regula-
tory pressure, and increased market scrutiny of banks).
154. See Heather Montgomery, Macroeconomic Effects of Capital Adequacy Regulation
in Japan, in DESIGNING FINANCIAL SYSTEMS IN EAST ASIA AND JAPAN 152, 178-80 (2004).
155. For a description of Japan's experience, see infra notes 175-189 and accompanying
text.
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being the minimum for international banks in the world's most finan-
cially developed economies and in over 100 others.1
6
B. Japan's Experience
Or, is that really the case? For Japan, implementing the Accord was
not without cost. The Accord's focus on capital adequacy centered on the
stability of individual banks-an approach at odds with Japan's practices
in the past, which had relied principally on government oversight over
the entire banking industry. Consequently, the adoption of the Accord
required Japan's regulators to introduce a new approach to Japanese
banking regulation.
57
Japan, nevertheless, anticipated little difficulty in complying with the
Accord when it was first announced in July 1988' 58 -once it was agreed
156. BIS, GIO Central Bank Governors and Heads of Supervision Endorse the Publica-
tion of the Revised Capital Framework (June 26, 2004), http://www.bis.org/press/p040626.
htm#pgtop. See also Guzman, supra note 12, at 1881 ("By 1992, most international banks in
major industrial countries were in compliance."); Daniel E. Ho, Compliance and International
Soft Law: Why do Countries Implement the Basle Accord?, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 647, 668-70
(2002) (finding high levels of compliance, based on the binary response to the World Bank
survey described in Barth, Caprio & Levine, infra note 243); Lee, supra note 105, at 6 (stating
that the Accord's methodology now applies to virtually all financial institutions worldwide);
Simmons, supra note 72, at 604 (describing widespread adoption of Accord guidelines; "Even
if these figures are exaggerated, they reflect an apparent desire to emulate the rules set forth
by the G-10."); Zaring, Informal Procedure, supra note 20, at 595 ("The Basle Accord ... has
enjoyed widespread compliance despite being putatively nonbinding.").
157. Yoshimasa Nishimura, who was Deputy Director General (1989-1992) and later
Director General (1994-1996) of the Banking Bureau of Japan's Ministry of Finance when the
Accord was implemented, later described differences in supervisory approach among Japa-
nese, U.S., and European banking regulators. From Nishimura's perspective, U.S. and
European supervisors looked to enhance the stability of individual banks, whereas banking
stability in Japan relied on overall regulatory administration of the financial system-
commonly referred to as the "convoy system." See Curtis J. Milhaupt & Geoffrey P. Miller,
Cooperation, Conflict, and Convergence in Japanese Finance: Evidence from the "Jusen"
Problem, 29 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1, 8-9 (1997) (describing Japan's historical convoy-
style regulation and avoidance of bank failure). With adoption of the Accord, and its focus on
individual bank capital, Nishimura found that "a financial system was no longer accepted in
which stability was important and national support, through a [banking] license, was consid-
ered the foundation of trust in Japanese financial institutions." While Japan had considered
alternative styles of supervision, the Accord was the Ministry's first experience in implement-
ing a different form of regulation. YOSHIMASA NISHIMuRA, NIHON No KIN'Y SEIDO
KAIKAKU [REFORM OF JAPAN'S FINANCIAL SYSTEM] 213 (2003) (translation).
158. Japan's regulators and bankers initially were concerned that the Accord unfairly
targeted Japanese banks in light of their global dominance and Japan's lower capital require-
ments. See SOLOMON, supra note 50, at 424 (quoting an undisclosed Ministry of Finance
official). As Nishimura noted, "[The global movement to introduce bank capital regulations]
was not entirely directed against Japan's financial activities, but it cannot be denied that one
motivating factor was that U.S. and European countries could no longer tolerate the aggressive
growth of Japanese banks in the overseas markets." NISHIMURA, supra note 157, at 210 (trans-
lation). Some commentators have posited that the Ministry also used gaiatsu (foreign
pressure) evidenced by the Accord to impose tighter capital requirements on, and so increase
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that Japan's banks could count up to 45 percent of latent gains on securi-
ties holdings ("hidden assets") as Tier 2 capital. 9 Japan's stock markets
were booming, inflating the value of Japanese capital and allowing
banks to raise new equity relatively inexpensively.' Banks could satisfy
Accord ratios by using existing assets, raising new capital in the public
markets, or both. In light of Japan's economic prominence, Japanese
bank regulators also looked to increase their cooperation with their for-
eign counterparts. Adopting the Accord was one way to signal this
intention.1
61
The costs of that signal skyrocketed 18 months later, in December
1989, when the Japanese stock market tumbled. Japan's banks were
among the hardest hit.' 62 When the Accord was announced, analysts had
estimated that "hidden assets" alone constituted 6 percent of regulatory
capital for Japan's city banks and 9 percent for its long-term credit
banks.' 63 The sudden drop in stock prices made it substantially more dif-
ficult for many banks to reach the Accord's minimums. Between March
1989 and March 1990, for example, the total value of just city bank
"hidden assets" declined by approximately $50.5 billion.' 6 Within a mat-
ter of months, Japan's banks also lost up to 40 percent of their public
market capitalization, handicapping their ability to access low cost eq-
uity.1
65
Some Japanese bankers argued against fully implementing the Ac-
cord. Senior officials at the Ministry of Finance, Japan's principal
financial regulator, cautioned against any amendment or delay, conclud-
ing that to do so could result in an international crisis of confidence in
its authority over, Japan's banking industry. See Colombatto & Macey, supra note 26, at 944;
Kentaro Tamura, A Regulator's Dilemma and Two-level Games: Japan in the Politics of Inter-
national Banking Regulation, 6 Soc. ScI. JAPAN J. 221, 25 (2003). A similar claim has been
made with respect to the United States. See PORTER, supra note 73, at 70-71.
159. KAPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 116; Tamura, supra note 158, at 234-35.
160. KAPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 116.
161. In describing why Japan acceded to the Accord, Nishimura explained, "It was nec-
essary for Japan to actively promote international cooperation in bank supervision with the
increasing international importance of its Tokyo market." NISHIMURA, supra note 157, at 211
(translation). Accession was also important because the Accord "was a symbol that the finan-
cial world had begun to globalize in the 1980s." Id. at 213 (translation).
162. See Allen B. Frankel & Paul B. Morgan, Deregulation and Competition in Japanese
Banking, 78 FED. REs. BULL. 579, 588-90 (1992) (describing the impact on Japan's bank
capital of the economic slowdown).
163. Duncan E. Alford, Basle Committee International Capital Adequacy Standards:
Analysis and Implications for the Banking Industry, 10 DICK. J. INT'L L. 189, 208 (1992).
164. How Should the U.S. Respond to the Japanese Challenge in Financial Services?, in
Examine Japanese Financial System and its Affect [sic] on Ability of U.S. Firms to Compete:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance,
Task Force on Int'l Competitiveness of U.S. Financial Institutions of House Committee on
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong. 69 (1990 statement of David D. Hale).
165. Id. at 37-39.
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Japan's financial system.' 66 Reinforcing this resolve was the perception
among global regulators that the Accord had "leveled the playing field"
among states, 167 preventing a jurisdiction from favoring its banks with
lower capital requirements (and hence a pricing advantage) over banks in
other jurisdictions.6' By adopting the Accord, Japan and its banks were
perceived to be "play[ing] the game according to more generally ac-
cepted rules," reinforcing Tokyo's position as a global financial center.',69
Japan's regulators also had an incentive to adopt the Accord to the
extent that being seen to "play by the rules" supported public perception
that the banking industry was financially stable. 70 Moreover, an about-
face refusal to adopt the Accord would have fueled concerns that Japan's
regulators were competing, not cooperating, with their foreign counter-
parts,'7' potentially resulting in measures by the United States and others
166. Tamura, supra note 158, at 235-36. See also Simmons, supra note 72, at 602 (states
that fail to adopt standards developed by the dominant financial center risk being perceived as
"poorly regulated").
167. NISHIMURA, supra note 157, at 211. As Hal Scott has noted, however, in light of
preexisting differences in regulation and accounting and tax rules, "it would [have been] a
total accident if the Accord did make the playing field more even." Hal S. Scott, The Competi-
tive Implications of the Basle Capital Accord, 39 ST. Louis U. L.J. 885, 886 (1995).
168. Japan's lower capital ratios were considered one reason why Japanese banks had
outperformed their U.S. and European peers. See DAYANAND ARORA, JAPANESE FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS IN EUROPE 189-93 (1995); NisIMuRA, supra note 157, at 210-11. To illustrate
those concerns, suppose that banks in state A have a 4% capital minimum and banks in state B
have a 6% minimum. If the assets in Bank A and Bank B are comprised of identical loans, and
shareholder returns are measured as returns on capital, then equal returns would mean that the
return for Bank A must only be two-thirds of the return for Bank B. If returns are derived
solely from interest charged on outstanding loans, then Bank A's rates can be one-third less
than Bank B's to achieve the same rate of return. See Hal S. Scott & Shinsaku Iwahara, In
Search of a Level Playing Field 5 (Group of Thirty, Occasional Paper No. 46, 1994). Bank A's
total lending capacity will also be greater than Bank B's. Due to the difference in capital ra-
tios, Bank A can lend up to 25 times its capital, whereas Bank B can only lend up to 16.66
times its capital. Id. at 5-6.
169. Editorial, Japan's Role In World Finance, FIN. TIMES, May 12, 1988, at 22.
170. See Philipp Genschel & Thomas Plimper, Regulatory Competition and Interna-
tional Co-operation, 4 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 626, 636-37 (1997) (observing that although the
Accord increased production costs, it was adopted by banks and regulators as a quick and
credible means to signal a bank's "soundness"). See also Mark J. Flannery & Joel F. Houston,
The Value of a Government Monitor for U.S. Banking Firms, 31 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANK-
ING 14, 32-33 (1999) (pointing out that federal supervisory examinations may enhance bank
market values).
171. There was U.S. precedent for those concerns. During the late 1800s and early
1900s, competition between U.S. federal and state regulators increased after adoption of the
National Banking Act of 1864 and the emergence of a dual banking system. In order to make
national bank charters more attractive, Congress agreed in 1900 to lower minimum bank capi-
tal requirements. Recognizing the potential impact on state bank charters, by 1909 all but one
state (Massachusetts) that had capital requirements above the new federal level had reduced
them in order to remain competitive. See Eugene Nelson White, The Political Economy of
Banking Regulation, 1864-1933, 42 J. ECON. HIST. 33, 35-37 (1982).
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to limit Japanese banking in their markets7 2 and risking rejection by the
international financial community. 73 Defection would also have im-
pacted the effectiveness of Japan's representatives on the Committee.1
4
Faced with new capital requirements and a decreased ability to meet
them, Japan's banks began to introduce practices to defer the full recog-
nition of reductions in capital. In many instances, they were assisted by
Japan's regulators-who refrained from fully enforcing Japan's bank
capital regulations during this period-in the false hope that the econ-
omy would soon recover and buoy the banking industry. 1
75
Among these practices was loan "evergreening," which involved
both the rollover of nonviable loans and the opening of new borrower
credit lines to repay existing overdue loans so they would not be counted
172. The Federal Reserve Board had expressed concern over the "unfair competitive
advantage" of foreign competitors with lower capital requirements over U.S. banks, raising the
possibility that Japanese banking activities in the United States would be curtailed. BOARD OF
GOVERNORS, 72 FED. RES. BULL. No. 1 71, ORDERS ISSUED UNDER BANK HOLDING COMPANY
ACT, BANK SERVICE CORPORATION ACT, AND FEDERAL RESERVE ACT-THE INDUSTRIAL
BANK OF JAPAN, LTD., TOKYO, JAPAN (Nov. 29, 1985) (Additional Views of Vice Chairman
Martin and Governor Rice). Balanced against that risk, according to senior U.S. officials, was
continued cooperation by Japan's regulators with their U.S. counterparts. See, e.g., E. Gerald
Corrigan, Trends in International Banking in the United States and Japan, FRBNY Q. REV. 5
(Autumn 1989) (The substantial presence of Japanese banks could raise public policy con-
cerns, balanced by factors including "the very close and cooperative efforts between official
institutions in the United States and Japan."). The threat of foreign market closure gradually
has become less important as Japan's banks have downsized overseas, most dramatically in
North America, although major banks continue to maintain an overseas presence. See Masa-
hiro Kawai, Japan's Banking System: From the Bubble and Crisis to Reconstruction 9
(Japanese Ministry of Finance, Pol'y. Res. Inst., Discussion Paper No. 03A-28, 2003).
173. See Kazuo Ueda, The Japanese Banking Crisis in the 1990's, in STRENGTHENING
THE BANKING SYSTEM IN CHINA: ISSUES AND EXPERIENCE 251, 260 n.10 (BIS, Policy Paper
No. 7, Oct. 1999), http://www.bis.org/publ/plcy07q.pdf.
174. "[A] central banker whose country failed to supervise banking activity in a manner
consistent with the Basle Accord would surely face a loss of influence in the international
regulation of banking and find it more difficult to enter into future negotiations." Guzman,
supra note 12, at 1880.
175. ADRIAN VAN RIXTEL, INFORMALITY AND MONETARY POLICY IN JAPAN 175-178
(2002); Akihiro Kanaya & David Woo, The Japanese Banking Crisis of the 1990s: Sources
and Lessons 26-28 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper 00/7, 2000); Joe Peek & Eric S.
Rosengren, Unnatural Selection: Perverse Incentives and the Misallocation of Credit in Ja-
pan, 95 Am. ECON. REV. 1144, 1144-45 (2005). Although the Ministry of Finance had
discretionary means to enforce compliance with the Accord, see VAN RIXTEL, supra, at 117-
23, the introduction of "prompt corrective action" (PCA) measures in 1998 was intended to
limit forbearance by requiring the authorities to take action based on objective criteria such as
a deterioration in capital adequacy ratios, see Milhaupt & Miller, supra note 157, at 68-69.
PCA measures have been used almost 100 times since their introduction, and Japan's regula-
tors have also implemented an "early warning system" to monitor deterioration in bank
management. Japan's Banks Rebuilt, THE BANKER, Aug. 1, 2004. But the effectiveness of
those measures has remained unclear in light of continued uncertainty over the calculation of
Japan's capital ratios. See Daisuke Uozumi, Controversy Builds Over Lenders'Health, NIKKEI
WEEKLY, June 3, 2002.
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against capital.'76 Banks also began to take on additional market and
credit risk by extending the average maturities of loans and relaxing
credit standards, partly in order to improve returns on assets and increase
capital.
77
Changes in accounting rules, and forbearance from enforcing exist-
ing regulations, also helped support Japan's banks. In August 1992, for
example, the Ministry of Finance introduced a temporary rule change
that deferred the reporting of stock portfolio losses until the following
fiscal year.17 1 Ministry officials were also aware of efforts by some banks
to "window dress" their books by transferring bad loans to paper compa-
nies and affiliates and rotating losses from one account to another.
79
Following the Asian financial crisis in 1997, Japan again relaxed its ac-
counting rules-this time in early 1998 (before the end of the banks'
fiscal year in March 1998) in order to permit banks to realize unrecog-
nized gains on property assets counted towards Tier 2 capital.'80 Japan
also permitted banks to change their accounting for securities holdings,
from the "lower of cost or market" method to cost basis accounting for
equities being held for investment purposes. These modifications re-
sulted in higher capital levels, 8' permitting many Japanese banks to
increase their regulatory capital base.
82
From the late 1990s, Japan's banks began to count a portion of their
deferred tax assets (DTAs)' 3 towards Tier 1 capital-eventually doing so
176. See Nobuo Inaba et al., Nonperforming Loans and the Real Economy: Japan's
Experience, in INVESTIGATING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FINANCIAL AND REAL
ECONOMY 106, 112-13 (BIS, Paper No. 22, 2005), http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/
bispap22g.pdf; Peek & Rosengren, supra note 175, at 1-2.
177. Kanaya & Woo, supra note 175, at 16-17. The banks cooked up a variety of other
techniques to prop up their balance sheets. See JENNIFER A. AMYX, JAPAN'S FINANCIAL CRI-
SIS: INSTITUTIONAL RIGIDITY AND RELUCTANT CHANGE 150-53 (2004).
178. Id. at 150.
179. Id. at 151. See also Deft Accounting Hides Finance Sector's Ills, NIKKEI WEEKLY,
Oct. 14, 1996 (describing "accounting forbearance" practices).
180. Satoshi Daigo, Tatsuya Yonetani & Kouhei Marumo, Banks Recapitalization Poli-
cies in Japan and their Impact on the Market 18-20 (Bank of Japan, Inst. for Monetary and
Econ. Stud., Discussion Paper Series 98-E-14, 1998).
181. Id. at 1-2, 10-12. Securities holdings have been reported at fair value from the
fiscal year commencing April 1, 2000. Katsumasa Suzuki, Future Prospects of Takeovers in
Japan Analyzed from the View of Share-ownership Structures and Laws in Comparison with
the United States and the European Union, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 777, 817 (2004).
182. See Hesna Genay, Assessing the Condition of Japanese Banks: How Informative are
Accounting Earnings?, 22 EcON. PERSP., Fourth Quarter 1998, at 12, 29-30 (describing dif-
ferences in U.S. and Japanese accounting practices).
183. A deferred tax asset is a tax receivable, arising from provisions against loans to a
troubled borrower, which is not recognized as tax-deductible for the period. The banks' inabil-
ity to receive tax write-offs on troubled loans lowered incentives to dispose of them, which
was partly offset when DTAs were allowed to be counted towards Tier I capital. Under Japa-
nese regulation, Tier 1 capital can only include an amount in DTAs equal to approximately
40% (the effective corporate tax rate) of five years of estimated taxable income. See RICHARD
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to excess, with 55 percent of Tier 1 capital on average being comprised
of DTAs in 2002 and 34 percent in 2003 .4 In theory, all DTAs can be
counted against future profits and so qualify as "good" capital in Japan.
The poor profitability of most Japanese banks, 85 however, weakened ex-
pectations that the DTAs would be fully utilized, drawing into question
their qualification as Tier 1 capital.'8 6 Some analysts have estimated that,
using a more rigorous measure, many of Japan's banks may have had
near-zero or negative capital during this period. 7
C. Koo, BALANCE SHEET RECESSION 174-76 (2003); Adrian van Rixtel, Ioana Alexopoulou &
Kimie Harada, The New Basel Capital Accord and Its Impact on Japanese Banking: A Quali-
tative Analysis, in THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD 371, 396-98 (Benton E. Gup ed., 2004).
For a description of the difference between the U.S. and Japanese treatment of DTAs, see Yo
Ota, Tax Treatments for Distressed Bank Loans: A Comparative Study of the United States and
Japanese Legal Systems, 10 J. PAC. RIM L. & POL'v 543, 580-85 (2001).
184. David Ibison & David Wells, Strategic Games for Japan's Banks: The Fight for
UFJ Shows Hope is Returning, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2004, at 15.
185. See Nobuo Inaba & Takashi Kozu, A Note on the Recent Behaviour of Japanese
Banks, in INVESTIGATING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FINANCIAL AND REAL ECONOMY
82, 82 (BIS, Paper No. 22, Apr. 2005), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/
bispap22.pdf (indicating that credit costs at Japanese banks have exceeded core operating
profits since fiscal 1993).
186. See Yasunobu Doi, Status of DTA---an Effective Regulatory Forbearance Tool to
Sustain Japanese Banks' Tier I Capital-May Face Ambiguity 1-2 (Moody's Investors Ser-
vice, Special Comment, Oct. 2003). Japanese accounting standards tightened after the collapse
of Resona Bank in early 2003. Amid widespread allegations that Japan's regulators had pres-
sured Resona's auditors to overstate capital, see Mayumi Negishi & Reiji Yoshida, Is Resona
the Tip of the Iceberg?, JAPAN TIMES, May 30, 2003, the bank was forced to revise its DTAs
downward, causing its capital adequacy ratio to fall to 2.07%, Japan Brief, Foreign Press Cen-
ter Japan, Government Injects Public Funds Into Resona Bank (May 30, 2003),
http://www.fpcj.jp/e/mres/japanbrief/jb_166.html. Japan's authorities continue to tackle bank
reliance on DTAs. See PROGRAM FOR FURTHER FINANCIAL REFORM, FINANCIAL SERVICES
AGENCY, JAPAN'S CHALLENGES: MOVING TOWARDS A FINANCIAL SERVICES NATION 8-9
(Dec. 2004); H. EDISON ET AL., INT'L MONETARY FUND, IMF COUNTRY REPORT No. 04/247,
JAPAN: SELECTED ISSUES 22-23 (Aug. 2004). DTAs, however, still account for a substantial
portion of Tier 1 capital. See BIS, 74TH ANNUAL REPORT 126 (June 28, 2004), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2004e.pdf.
187. See, e.g., Japanese Banks Have Negative Capital, GLOBAL RISK REGULATOR, Jan.
2003, at 10-11 ; JAPAN CENTER FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH, JAPAN FINANCIAL REPORT No. 6,
CREDIBILITY OF GOVERNMENT, CORPORATE, AND BANKING SECTORS IN JAPAN 1 (Mar. 2002).
Japan's regulators have become more aggressive in assessing bank portfolios. See Anthony
Rowley, Japanese Banks Take Cold Comfort from NPL Investigation, THE BANKER, Feb. 1,
1999, at 10. But regulators have delayed adopting new rules on the treatment of DTAs rather
than risk slowing bank disposal of nonperforming loans. See FSA to Delay Adoption of Rules
on Deferred Tax Assets, JAPAN WEEKLY MONITOR, June 21, 2004. This is partly because DTAs
have cushioned the full impact of loan loss provisions on unconsolidated earnings. See Ota,
supra note 183, at 583-85. Consequently, concerns remain over the accuracy of public reports
on Japan's bad loan problem and the capital adequacy of its banks. See, e.g., Mitsuhiro Fukao,
Financial Sector Profitability and Double-Gearing, in STRUCTURAL IMPEDIMENTS To
GROWTH IN JAPAN 9, 12-15 (2003); VAN RIXTEL, supra note 175, at 181; BIS Urges Japan to
Replenish Banks' Capital Bases, JAPAN WEEKLY MONITOR, July 15, 2002 (quoting a BIS
statement that "[m]any commentators view the official problem loan figures as understating
the true scale of the difficulties").
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Certain disparities in compliance no doubt arose from preexisting
differences in national practice, financial/accounting measures, and su-
pervisory procedures,'88 as well as the Accord's reliance on national
discretion in applying certain standards.'89 Japan's actions also reflected
changing economic circumstances over the period, with the costs of
compliance soaring between adoption of the Accord in 1988 and its ef-
fective date in March 1993.
The principal factors affecting compliance, however, arose from
competition between network standards and competing domestic inter-
ests, on balance weighing in favor of adopting the Accord but against full
compliance with its terms. As described earlier, senior Ministry officials
agreed to support the Accord and looked to it as one means to demon-
strate Japan's commitment to global regulatory cooperation. Adoption
would provide Japan with the benefits of network membership; failing to
do so potentially risked network sanctions that, among other things,
could damage the standing and reputation of Japan's senior regulators.
Balanced against these interests were those of political leaders, senior
bankers, and Ministry officials responsible for Japan's budget, all of whom
were actors outside the regulatory network which created the Accord, who
favored a delay in fully enforcing its terms.' 9 Regulatory forbearance and
changes in tax and accounting rules provided Japan's politicians, bankers,
and domestic regulators with some breathing room, postponing official
recognition of the magnitude of Japan's nonperforming loan problem 9 ' as
188. See Scott & Iwahara, supra note 168, at 3, 55, 67-69 (discussing certain preexisting
differences in Japan).
189. Although the Accord is to be applied with a "high degree of consistency," Accord,
supra note 13, at 3, "[iun certain very limited respects (notably as regards some risk weight-
ings)... [the Accord] allows for a degree of national discretion in the way it is applied:' id. at
6, particularly in light of national accounting and regulatory supervisory differences, id. at
14. See MAXIMILIAN J.B. HALL, BANKING REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 188-217 (1993)
(noting the differences in implementation in the United Kingdom, the United States, and Ja-
pan); PRICE WATERHOUSE, BANK CAPITAL ADEQUACY AND CAPITAL CONVERGENCE 9-12
(1991) (describing bank concerns relating to inter-state differences in the exercise of national
discretion). But see John Wagster, James Kolari & Kerry Cooper, Market Reaction to National
Discretion in Implementing the Basle Accord, 19 J. FIN. RES. 339 (1996) (observing that na-
tional discretion did not compromise the Accord's goal of competitive equality in international
capital).
190. Japan's financial regulatory system in the 1990s has been characterized as a "car-
tel"-a cooperative group, comprised of politicians, regulators, and regulated industries, that
coordinated decision-making processes in order to generate and allocate benefits among group
members. Milhaupt & Miller, supra note 157, at 12-19. Partly as a result of norms among
cartel members, id. at 16-21, Japan's legislature was unable to exercise effective control over
its principal bank regulator. Amyx, supra note 177, at 41-60. Instead, compliance relied sub-
stantially on informal relationships among politicians, regulators, and senior bankers. Id. at
61-84; Milhaupt & Miller, supra note 157, at 13-16.
191. See Ronald E. Shrieves & Drew Dahi, Discretionary Accounting and the Behavior of
Japanese Banks under Financial Duress, 27 J. BANKING & FIN. 1219, 1241 (2003) (examining
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well as the negative effect of write-downs on Japan's declining tax reve-
nues. 92 The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) preferred using delay
over taxpayer money and supported efforts to "evergreen" loans to im-
portant constituencies. The banks also favored forbearance, since greater
balance sheet scrutiny could expose capital inadequacies, risk the possi-
bility of national supervision, and potentially cause the resignation of
senior bankers. In addition, the Ministry was able to play down the prob-
lems of Japan's banking industry (and, by association, its own
supervisory failure) and postpone legislative action that could jeopardize
its autonomy.
193
What may be unique about Japan's experience are the lengths to
which its regulators went to remain in formal (if not substantive) com-
pliance with the 8% minimum. Japan's banks navigated changes in
business operations and lending, risk management, and accounting poli-
cies; and Japan's authorities refrained from enforcing their own capital
regulations and adopted changes in Japanese GAAP and tax accounting
that were intended to inflate capital levels.'9 The effect has been to sub-
stantially weaken Japan's capital requirements without Japan formally
defecting from the Accord. In fact, at slight risk of exaggeration, one
how earnings management and regulatory capital arbitrage permitted banks and regulators to
postpone decisions regarding Japan's banking crisis).
192. Financial and tax considerations historically influenced Ministry of Finance poli-
cies, reflecting the political dominance and competing agenda of the Financial and Tax
Bureaus (responsible for the Japanese national budget) over the Banking Bureau (responsible
for supervising Japan's banks). Notwithstanding the Ministry's decision to implement the
Accord, fully enforcing it would require Japan's banks to write down a substantial amount of
nonperforming loans, adversely affecting Japan's tax revenues. Ota, supra note 183, at 558-
59, 563.
193. Amyx, supra note 177, at 147-62; Gerard Baker, Spotting the End of the Bad Debt
Era: Sumitomo's Y280bn Loss May Be the Bank's Best Birthday Present, FIN. TIMEs, Jan. 30,
1995, at 19 (regarding Ministry and banking concerns). Internal Ministry of Finance tensions
may have been complicated by the relationship between the Ministry's International Finance
and Banking Bureaus. The Ministry's most senior contact with U.S. and other foreign officials
was Toyoo Gyohten, the Vice Minister of Finance for International Affairs. See PETER HART-
CHER, THE MINISTRY: How JAPAN'S MOST POWERFUL INSTITUTION ENDANGERS WORLD
MARKETS 223 (1998). In that capacity, Gyohten was a principal contact for U.S. regulators in
discussing the Accord. See SOLOMON, supra note 50, at 422-23. Nevertheless, it was the
Banking Bureau that was principally responsible for regulating Japan's banks, and it had less
experience in (and perhaps less sensitivity regarding) coordinating with its foreign counter-
parts. Id. at 423. Consequently, while Gyohten was sensitive to the importance of network
relationships, and worked privately with Gerald Corrigan, chief of the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York, to implement the Accord, id. at 423-24, later compliance remained with Bank-
ing Bureau regulators who were less directly involved in maintaining cross-border
relationships, see HARTCHER, supra note 193, at 223-24.
194. Regulatory forbearance, as a means to help shore up reported capital, also took
place during the U.S. savings and loan crisis of the 1980s, before adoption of the Accord. See
Michael S. Levitt, The Abrogation of Forbearance Agreements: FIRREA's Ambiguities De-
manda More Principled Analysis, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1314, 1314-17 (1993).
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could say that the Japanese authorities pursued almost every avenue ex-
cept outright defection-seeking to comply with the letter of the Accord,
if not its spirit.'95
This is not meant to suggest the Accord's overall impact on global
capital levels has been negative. Following its introduction, declining
capital levels in the world's principal financial markets generally re-
versed, in many cases at substantial cost to the regulated banks.9 6 Market
forces, prompted by the Accord, played a substantial role, 97 with capital
adequacy becoming a market standard for measuring a bank's strength.9
These same forces (and a rising stock market) may have caused capital
levels in some jurisdictions to rise substantially above the 8% mini-
mum,199 providing banks with their own business-related incentives to
enhance their capital position, such as lower funding costs and a capital
buffer to exploit future investment opportunities."
Elevated capital levels alone, however, are not evidence of state
compliance with the Accord.20' Absent that compliance, it becomes less
clear whether the weakest segments of the banking industry-where
state enforcement is likely to be most needed-are in line with Accord
standards. Regulatory forbearance is particularly troublesome in the case
of bank capital. In general, the threat of regulatory action is necessary to
induce banks to quickly meet their minimum capital requirements. 2°,
The market may, of course, impose a cost on individual banks which
fall short of the Accord. For example, lenders and investors became
increasingly aware of Japan's weakened capital position during the late
1990s, as evidenced by the premium on loans to Japanese banks that
appeared in the Eurodollar interbank market in 1995, the drop in
Japanese bank stock prices, and, more recently, the increase in Japanese
195. See Eichengreen, supra note 60, at 1113 ("Nothing has compelled countries such as
Japan, where capital has not been written down to reflect the extent of nonperforming loans, to
conform with the spirit as opposed to the letter of the Accord.").
196. PORTER, supra note 73, at 76-78. See also Jackson et al., supra note 145, at 7 (indi-
cating a rise in the G-10 industry average from 9.3 % in 1988 to 11.2 % in 1996).
197. KAPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 126; Freeland, supra note 63, at 233-34.
198. PORTER, supra note 73, at 77-78. Threats of market closure for failing to comply
with Accord standards may have also affected compliance levels. See supra note 172 and
accompanying text.
199. See Bikker & Metzemakers, supra note 15, at 3; Jackson et al., supra note 145, at 6.
200. Jackson, supra note 145, at 6-7.
201. A Committee paper has suggested that an actively enforced regulatory standard
may permit markets to pressure banks to increase capital, although there is no direct evidence.
Id. at 15.
202. Joe Peek & Eric Rosengren, Bank Regulation and the Credit Crunch, 19 J. BANK-
ING & FIN. 679, 691 (1995).
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bank-related credit derivative spreads. 03 Accord standards, however, are
prudential and impose a greater cost of doing business for most banks.
Consequently, regulatory leniency may provide a competitive advantage
to banks organized in that state. °4
C. Japan's Experience, Ten Years Later
By 1998, a decade after the Accord was first announced, Asia's fi-
nancial crisis had substantially weakened the Asian and world
economies. Senior officials in the United States and elsewhere looked to
Japan to be the engine of recovery. Yet Japan's economic conditions con-
tinued to decline during 1998,05 heightening global economic insecurity
and prompting calls for it to introduce measures to jumpstart its econ-
206omy.
Domestically, the public revelation of Japan's banking problems
strained the historically close relationship between the Ministry of
Finance and the LDP. Criticism of the Ministry ballooned, as did legisla-
tive interest in financial issues previously left to Ministry supervision-
resulting, in part, in delays in addressing Japan's growing banking prob-
lems. °7 Those delays came to a head in 1998 following a series of
financial scandals involving the Ministry, the continued growth in bank-
held bad loans, and the possibility that major banks, such as the Long-
Term Credit Bank, could fail.2°
203. See Takatoshi Ito & Kimie Harada, Bank Fragility in Japan, 1995-2003 10-15
(CESifo, Working Paper No. 1137, 2004); Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren, Determinants of the
Japan Premium: Actions Speak Louder than Words, 53 J. INT'L ECON. 283, 283-89 (2001).
204. See supra note 168 for a discussion of the competitive advantages of a lower capital
level. The Moody's Investors Service treatment of regulatory capital is instructive here.
Moody's bank analyses tend to focus on economic, rather than regulatory, capital. Moody's
Investors Service, Rating Methodology: Bank Credit Risk (An Analytical Framework for
Banks in Developed Markets) 36-37 (Apr. 1999). Regulatory capital, nevertheless, is still
relevant, since banks falling short may "see their activities restricted or ... may even [be]
closed down by the regulators." Id. at 37. Consequently, after Japan introduced stricter prompt
corrective action measures, see supra note 175 and accompanying text, Moody's announced a
prospective cut in Japanese bank credit ratings-reflecting the "potential adverse effects" of
those measures " 'diminish[ing] the availability of accounting forbearance to put off the rec-
ognition of unrealized losses.'" Moody's May Cut Credit Ratings of 5 Japanese Banks,
KYODo NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 26, 1997. Leniency in enforcing capital requirements, rather than
regulatory capital levels themselves, appears to have been more relevant to the Moody's analy-
sis.
205. See Amyx, supra note 177, at 273-75 (showing regulatory, political, economic, and
international timelines in 1998).
206. Edward J. Lincoln, Japan Summit: Economics Matter (The Brookings Institution,
Policy Brief# 49, 1999).
207. See Amyx, supra note 177, at 166-73, 181-86.
208. See Van Rixtel, supra note 175, at 175-243 (providing a detailed account of the
growing banking and economic crises during the period).
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U.S. options to pressure Japan for change were limited. Direct sanc-
tions could hurt Japan, in turn potentially damaging the U.S. and other
economies. This made it more attractive to U.S. leaders to support Japa-
nese policies that were consistent with their own, as well as to resort to
symbolic and informal pressures.2 9 As one commentator reported, "de-
spite the rhetoric out of Washington, the U.S. can only go so far in
prying change out of Japan.... Washington will continue to talk tough
and make legitimate demands. But it won't let Japan be pushed to the
wall.
, 210
In this environment, global regulators and bankers began to focus
more closely on Japan's banking industry and its efforts to restore bank-
ing stability. The Japanese banking crisis was not news to the world's
regulators1  or the financial markets. What became news, however, was
the admission by Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa and Bank of Japan
Governor Masaru Hayami, in advance of an early October 1998 meeting
of G-7 leaders, that Japan's banks were substantially undercapitalized.
The New York Times later reported the meeting with Treasury Secre-
tary Robert Rubin and Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan.
Hayami advised that capital supporting Japan's major banks had dwin-
dled to "dangerously low levels, ''213 potentially resulting in Japan's banks
being banned from operating internationally "'if the rules were vigor-
ously pursued. ' ' 21 4 Even though he later claimed his remarks were
limited to Tier 1 capital, 25 Hayami confirmed publicly that Japan's major
banks were indeed "undercapitalized. 2 6 Deputy Treasury Secretary
Larry Summers, who attended the meeting, recounted:
209. In early 1998, for example, President Clinton had traveled to Asia, skipping a stop-
over in Tokyo but later "standing shoulder to shoulder with Chinese leaders criticizing
Japanese economic policy," a public blow to Japan's leadership. See White House Special
Briefing, President Clinton's Trip to Asia and the APEC Ministerial (FED. NEWS SERv. Nov.
12, 1998) [hereinafter APEC Briefing] (noting the comments of Undersecretary of State for
Political Affairs and former Ambassador to Japan Michael Armacost). The Administration also
criticized Japan's handling of its banking problems, both publicly and in private meetings with
senior Japanese officials, enlisting the support of G-7, East Asian, and other leaders in doing
so. Lincoln, supra note 206; David E. Sanger, U.S. and Japanese Confer but Differ on Eco-
nomic Cures, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1998, at Al.
210. Neff, supra note 50.
211. See HARTCHER, supra note 193, at 177 (noting that then Vice Minster of Finance for
International Affairs, Eisuke Sakakibara, warned the U.S. Treasury in 1996 that Japan was on
the brink of a major banking crisis).
212. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
213. David E. Sanger, Japanese Tell US. That Their Banks are in Big Trouble, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 5, 1998, at Al.
214. Id. (quoting an anonymous senior Ministry official).
215. Hayami Says N.Y limes Mistook His Comment on Bank Capital, JuI PRESS TICKER
SERVICE, Oct. 7, 1998.
216. Japan's Banks Add to Crisis; Confusion Reigns at Global Meeting as Japanese
Officials Offer Opposite Assessments, ATLANTA J. CONST., Oct. 5, 1998, at Al.
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Governor Hayami acknowledged what I think has been widely
recognized for a long time, that there are important strains on the
Japanese banking system with substantial loan losses that have
eroded the value of Japanese capital. But he did not say anything
that broke new ground or went beyond other things that have
been said for a long time, with respect to the Japanese banking
system.... although I certainly heard a good deal that was som-
ber and cause for concern .... "'
Reaction was swift. The following days' G-7 meetings devoted con-
siderable attention to Japan.2" Those meetings were bleak (one attendee
claimed to have "'had more fun at funerals' ,,);2'9 and, while officials dis-
agreed over various policy matters, The New York imes reported that
"they agreed repeatedly and publicly that the chief villain in [the Asian
financial crisis was] Japan., 220 An unusual public call by the G-7 minis-
ters and central bank governors followed, requesting that Japanese
leaders quickly use public funds to recapitalize Japan's banks.22' The
IMF and World Bank echoed that call the next day,22 with the East Asia
Economic Summit following suit a few weeks later.
23
Public criticism of Japan and its leadership dealt a reputational blow
to the network standing and influence of Japan's senior central bankers
and regulators. Following the G-7 meeting, the Nihon Keizai Shimbun
(Nikkei) newspaper (Japan's leading business and economic newspaper)
commented that the failure of Japan's leaders to resolve the banking cri-
sis threatened to "undercut Japan's G-7 clout." The article went on to
report: "Japan is becoming a washout within the [G-7]. That's what Ja-
pan's top financial policy-makers were told at the recent Washington,
D.C., meeting with their G-7 colleagues as Japanese officials got a good
217. White House Press Briefing by National Economic Adviser Gene Sperling and
Deputy Treasury Secretary Larry Summers (Oct. 5, 1998) (FDCH Federal Department and
Agency Documents).
218. Paul Blustein, U.S. Aid Proposals Get G-7 Backing; Risks "Increasing" From Asian
Crisis, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 1998, at Al.
219. David E. Sanger, Meeting of World Finance Leaders Ends, With No Grand Strategy
but Many Ideas, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 8, 1998, at A6.
220. Id.
221. Amyx, supra note 177, at 207-08; Statement by the G-7 Finance Ministers and
Central Bank Governors (Oct. 3, 1998), http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/finance/fml00398.htm.
222. Time to Get Japan Right, for a Change, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1998, at B2; Com-
munique of the Interim Committee of the Board of Governors of the International Monetary
Fund (Oct. 4, 1998), http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/cm/1998/100498.htm.
223. Michael Richardson, A Plea to End "Drift" in World Economy; Business and Po-
litical Leaders in Asia Ask G-7 to Reform Global Financial System, INT'L HERALD TiB., Oct.
14, 1998, at 1.
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talking-to at the group's annual autumn get-together. ' 224 Reflecting G-7
concerns over the "Japan problems," the Nikkei then warned: "In order
[for Japan] to maintain a big say in [future G-7 issues], Japan should not
be content with being a 'backward pupil' among the G-7 nations.
' 2
Potential network sanctions favored government action to recapital-
ize (at least in part) Japan's banking industry. One commentator noted,
"A more hard-line stance by Washington would be useful because it
would give Japanese leaders the political cover to initiate tough re-
forms. 226 Miyazawa and Hayami may have anticipated the impact of
their comments, publicly announcing in Washington, D.C., shortly after
meeting with Rubin and Greenspan, that public funds would be neces-
sary to recapitalize Japan's banks.227 Public statements by U.S. and other
leaders improved after passage of Japan's bank bailout legislation less
than one month later.
D. A New Perspective on Japan's Experience
Japan's experience with the Accord may be an exception to the oft-
held view that international commitments reflect, rather than influence,
how states choose to act.229 Japan's early experience certainly fell within
that pattern-at the time the Accord was introduced, Japan's costs of im-
plementing the Accord were largely borne by its bureaucrats, who needed
to formulate new regulations in line with Accord requirements. A rising
economy lowered the costs to Japanese banks of complying with the Ac-
cord, making it easier for them to accept the new standards. Those costs
skyrocketed, however, with the decline in Japan's stock markets. Rather
than defect, Japan continued to adhere to the Accord-at least nomi-
nally-by maintaining the 8% minimum, even when actual compliance
224. Financial Dawdling Threatens to Undercut Japan's G-7 Clout, THE NIKKEI
WEEKLY, Oct. 12, 1998, at 14.
225. Id.
226. Maurice R. Greenberg, The Global Financial Crisis (Nixon Center Perspectives,
Vol. 3, No. 5) (paper summarizing remarks presented on Oct. 7, 1998). See also supra notes
74, 158 for a discussion of two-level games and gaiatsu (foreign pressure) in Japan.
227. See G7-IMF: BOJ Hayami Says Public Fund Injection into Japan Banks "Un-
avoidable," AFX NEWS, Oct. 4, 1998; G7-1MF: Japan's Miyazawa says Recapitalization
Scheme May Exceed 13 Trln Yen, AFX NEWS, Oct. 5, 1998.
228. U.S. advisers recommended that the President praise the new legislation, "patting
Japan on the back and encouraging them to get going," even if he continued to express reser-
vations in private. See APEC Briefing, supra note 209 (quoting Ed Lincoln, Brookings
Institution). A similar message was included in the G-7 ministers' announcement at the end of
October, hailing the new laws as "a major step forward in the process of strengthening the
financial system" and noting the Japanese authorities' intention to undertake "essential swift
and effective action to complete the process." Declaration of G7 Fin. Ministers and Cent. Bank
Governors at 3 (Oct. 30, 1998), http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/g7/103098dc.htm.
229. See, e.g., Downs, Rocke & Barsoom, supra note 75, at 387; Raustiala, supra note 1,
at 397.
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with the Accord was lower. Network norms and signaling may provide
some new insight into what occurred.
Japan's regulators were concerned about international reaction to de-
laying or failing to implement the Accord. Unless Japan "played by the
rules," it risked signaling a refusal to cooperate, which could potentially
weaken its influence among its global network peers and lead to sanc-
tions from U.S. and other regulators.23 ° Consequently, Japan had strong
incentives to implement the Accord, help develop its provisions (such as
those on "hidden assets"), endorse its terms, and formally incorporate its
standards into domestic regulation.
The costs to Japan of implementing the Accord sent a credible signal
to others. Simply implementing the Accord required Japan's regulators
to adopt a different form of banking regulation, which was itself costly.
2 3'
Over time, in order for Japanese banks to maintain nominal compliance
with Accord requirements, Japan's regulators and bankers incurred addi-
tional cost-for example, by adjusting domestic accounting and tax
rules. Lower levels of actual compliance, however, reflected competing
domestic interests, principally among actors outside the global network
that formulated the Accord.232
Beginning in the mid-1990s, market forces began to impose higher
costs of funding on Japan's banks,233 partly reflecting market partici-
pants' reaction to Japan's "nominal-but fictional-compliance with the
Accord.' 234 Regulators, however, continued to show considerable for-
bearance with Japan's lower levels of compliance, perhaps "accept[ing]
that Japan [was] facing severe banking difficulties, and that regulators
there need[ed] time to deal with them.' 235 Network regulators may have
excused lower levels of compliance based on an understanding of the
particularly costly nature of compliance in unexpected circumstances.236
As a result, Japan's continued adherence to the 8% minimum, even in
the face of substantial economic setback, may have been "close enough"
230. See supra notes 166-174 and accompanying text.
231. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 190-193 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
234. The New Basel Accord, supra note 119, at 169 (providing the written testimony of
David A. Spina, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, State Street Corporation).
235. Embattled Japanese Banks Sweat for Basel II, 1 GLOBAL RISK REGULATOR 9, 21
(Apr. 2003). Foreign regulators were, of course, concerned about Japan's banking problems
and continued to press for reform. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
236. In that respect, Japan's deviation from the Accord may have been accepted by net-
work members in the same way that temporary deviations from the gold standard were
accepted by capital markets investors. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. Network
members may have also been reluctant to claim directly that Japan had defected from a net-
work standard, see supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text, relying instead on network
pressures to pursue banking reforms, see supra note209 and accompanying text.
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to signal to other regulators its continued cooperation.2 ' Hayami's
statements may have changed that signal by acknowledging Japan's in-
ability to continue to adhere to the 8% minimum absent public
recapitalization of its banks-a meaningful admission in light of interna-
tional frustration over Japan's perceived unwillingness to move quickly
to address its banking problems. The resulting threat of network sanction
and "foreign pressure"
238 may have helped facilitate domestic reforms.
239
E. Accord Compliance Generally
A recent IMF survey suggests Japan is not alone in failing to comply
fully with the Accord. It found the implementation of global regulatory
standards to be "broadly satisfactory, on average," but with important ex-
ceptions, uncovering variations in regulatory sanctions and enforcement
that made the implementation of global standards uneven.
24 In particular,
the study noted that "[clapital adequacy measures are often loosely ap-
plied to promote indigenous banks, or are unreliable due to weak loan
classification and provisioning practices," reflecting competing regula-
tory objectives and public policy considerations.2 4 ' The IMF also found,
in approximately one-quarter of the assessments, deficiencies in moni-
toring and inspection systems meant to ensure compliance with capital
and prudential requirements.
24 2
Another study has also found varying levels of compliance with the
Accord. Its analysis of 18 states suggests that state compliance has
tended to be based upon existing regulatory practices rather than Accord
standards. While some convergence has occurred, the study concluded
that the pre-Accord status quo was an important determinant of levels of
237. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 74, 158 and accompanying text.
239. It is possible that Japan adopted the Accord in 1988 simply in order to ease interna-
tional pressure for more costly changes in domestic policy, later choosing to forego from fully
enforcing its terms. See Hathaway, supra note 18, at 1941 (The "relatively costless step of
treaty ratification may ... offset pressure for costly changes in policies"). That explanation,
however, does not fully account for the significant costs Japan actually incurred to implement
the new standards, see supra note 157 and accompanying text, and later to maintain compli-
ance with the letter (if not spirit) of the 8% minimum, see supra notes 175-187 and
accompanying text, even after the magnitude of its banking problems became publicly known,
see supra notes 203, 211-212 and accompanying text. A network norms and signaling analy-
sis fills that gap by explaining why Japan's implementation of the Accord was meaningful to
others and why lower levels of actual compliance were accepted by network members.
240. Issues and Gaps, supra note 127, at 4. The 36-state analysis was based on assess-
ments from 2000 to 2003 and published in late 2004.
241. Id. at21.
242. Id. at 17.
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state compliance.243 Earlier surveys also noted variations in compliance
with other Committee standards.2"
Surprisingly, many scholars report that the Accord enjoys high levels
of compliance globally.45 Although one can only speculate, part of the
reason may be the limited number of empirical analyses of compliance to
date; the IMF study was published in late 2004 and, while important, its
analyses are preliminary. In addition, the Basel Committee does not moni-
tor Accord compliance, choosing instead to rely principally on surveys and
decentralized self-reporting. Committee members may also offer optimis-
tic assessments of compliance in order to reinforce the Accord's status as
a global standard.246 Finally, in an industry characterized by substantial
cross-country variation, the sheer number of authorities that have
adopted the 8% minimum is impressive-74 percent of 106 states sur-
veyed responded that their minimum capital level was 8% or more, and
93 percent indicated that their capital requirements were in line with Ac-
cord guidelines. 7 Yet, as Japan's experience and the IMF study indicate,
adoption of the 8% minimum does not ensure a state is actually comply-
ing with the Accord.
The IMF study suggests that the relationship between network
norms and compliance described in this Article may exist in a number of
states. As Japan's experience illustrates, network norms may modify
what constitutes an "acceptable" level of compliance, permitting varia-
243. See Bryce Quillin, Understanding Degrees of Compliance with the 1988 Basel
Accord: Results from an 18 Country Dataset 35-36 (Aug. 2003) (unpublished mimeo on file
with the author; based on research for unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London School of Econom-
ics). Another analysis of Accord compliance was based on a World Bank database of 107
states, assigning a value of "1" to those responding that their minimum capital ratios con-
formed to Accord standards and "0" to those responding otherwise. Of 107 states, 100
responded "yes" and seven responded "no." No assessment, however, was made of intermedi-
ate levels of complianc. See James R. Barth, Gerard Caprio, Jr. & Ross Levine, The
Regulation and Supervision of Banks Around the World: A New Database 17 (World Bank,
Pol'y Res. Working Paper No. 2588, 2001).
244. The Committee noted that, among 124 states surveyed, many had regulations in
place consistent with the Committee's Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision
(Sept. 1997), but had not had them fully or effectively implemented. U.S. GENERAL Ac-
COUNTING OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: ACTIONS TAKEN TO REFORM FINANCIAL
SECTORS IN ASIAN EMERGING MARKETS: REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS 24 (1999).
Weak enforcement of Committee standards was also cited by U.S. authorities as one reason
for the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s. Id. at 24-30.
245. See supra note 156.
246. See, e.g., William J. McDonough, President and CEO of the Fed. Res. Bank of
N.Y., Update on the Major Initiative to Revise the 1988 Capital Accord, Speech Before the 4th
Annual Supervision Conference of the British Bankers Association (June 19, 2000), available
at http://www.bis.org/review/ r000622b.pdf (describing the success of the Accord and initia-
tives to revise it).
247. Barth, Caprio & Levine, supra note 243, at 10-11. The authors note, however, that
ratios are not necessarily comparable from state to state due to variations in capital composi-
tion. Id. at 11.
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tions in enforcing the Accord. Variable levels of compliance, therefore,
may be less an indication that states intentionally deviate from standards
to which they have agreed and more an indication that network norms
permit those deviations to occur. Compliance that is "close enough,"
consistent with network norms, may be understood to signal support of
the overall purpose of the Accord even when actual compliance is lower.
If accurate, this explanation would help reconcile the IMF survey with
statements made by Committee members and scholars regarding high
levels of compliance.248
CONCLUSION
Enforcement is, for those being regulated, where the "rubber meets
the road." While global standards such as the Accord evidence a growing
commonality in international regulation, their practical effect will continue
to vary from state to state so long as there are differences in their
administration. As this Article explains, those differences may partly
reflect norms which permit lower levels of state compliance to occur
without being considered a defection. Future consideration of global
standards and practices, accordingly, should be accompanied by a greater
focus on how they are administered at the national level.
There are undoubtedly a multitude of factors beyond the scope of
this Article that affect the actions of senior regulators. Over time, incor-
porating these factors into an analysis of state compliance should
provide a more textured understanding of what causes different levels of
compliance and why states choose to comply, or not comply, with inter-
national obligations. In addition, these factors suggest that future studies
of global compliance should consider the extent to which norms among
regulators allow for deviation from the black letter of international obli-
gations.
Different actors may interpret compliance with, or defection from, a
global standard differently. Market participants, for example, may react
to a deviation differently from regulators, perhaps due to differences in
context. Future research should also consider what circumstances cause
such a departure and their impact on compliance, and, finally, the role
that emerging global administrative regulation and practice may play in
managing those differences.
248. See CHAYES & CHAYES, SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 8, at 17-18 (noting that accept-
able levels of compliance may vary with the significance and cost of reliance that parties place
on others' performance); Bilder, supra note 48, at 69 (finding that lowered expectations of
performance may cause officials to view even occasional performance as substantive compli-
ance).
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